

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

DOES TAX AVOIDANCE TRICKLE DOWN? EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT

Justin E. Holz
Ricardo Perez-Truglia
Alejandro Zentner

Working Paper 34209
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w34209>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
September 2025, Revised October 2025

This Draft: October 15, 2025. First Draft: September 1, 2025. We are thankful for excellent comments from Jacob Goldin. This project was reviewed and approved in advance by the Institutional Review Board at The University of Texas at Dallas. The field experiment was pre-registered in the AEA RCT Registry (AEARCTR-0009298). To prevent contamination of the subject pool (e.g., that subjects could read about the hypotheses being tested), we posted the RCT pre-registration immediately after the deadline to file an appeal had passed, but before the post-treatment data was available for analysis. After the study is accepted for publication, we will share all the code and data through a public repository. Alexia Witthaus Vine provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

© 2025 by Justin E. Holz, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, and Alejandro Zentner. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

Does Tax Avoidance Trickle Down? Evidence from a Field Experiment
Justin E. Holz, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, and Alejandro Zentner
NBER Working Paper No. 34209
September 2025, Revised October 2025
JEL No. C9, H26, Z13

ABSTRACT

The wealthiest individuals frequently engage in tax avoidance, and public awareness of this behavior is growing. Such awareness may undermine tax compliance among the broader population, either by revealing strategies others can emulate or by shifting social norms to make avoidance seem more acceptable. We first document that individuals are less tolerant of both tax avoidance and tax evasion when carried out by the wealthiest households. We next present results from a field experiment on property tax appeals, which—like other forms of tax avoidance—is used disproportionately by the wealthiest households. Providing information about the appeal rates of the richest-1% of households increased individuals’ perceptions of unfairness, but did not affect their own appeal decisions—measured via administrative records—or even their expected tax savings. Information about the prevalence of appeals among comparable households also had no effect. By contrast, information about the expected financial gains from appealing had a significant effect on appeal choices. In sum, while the public condemns tax avoidance by the wealthiest households, we find no sign that such behavior encourages similar actions among the broader population.

Justin E. Holz
University of Michigan
Ford School of Public Policy
holzj@umich.edu

Alejandro Zentner
University of Texas at Dallas
azentner@utdallas.edu

Ricardo Perez-Truglia
University of California, Los Angeles
and NBER
ricardotruglia@gmail.com

A randomized controlled trials registry entry is available at AEARCTR-0009298
An online appendix is available at <http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w34209>

1 Introduction

The old adage “every law has a loophole” rings especially true when it comes to tax law. No matter how meticulously tax codes are crafted, there are always opportunities for individuals and corporations to reduce their tax burden through legal means. Unlike tax evasion, which involves illegal actions and carries a heavy stigma, tax avoidance is often perceived more favorably—and sometimes even seen as a sign of financial savvy. Moreover, whereas evasion is hidden and difficult to detect, avoidance operates in the open, much like a magician performing a trick in full view of the audience.

The wealthiest individuals and corporations are both the most capable of and the most likely to engage in tax avoidance. For example, some reports suggest that, thanks to sophisticated accounting strategies, billionaires face an average tax rate significantly lower than that of the typical American (e.g., ProPublica, 2023). The ultra-wealthy can afford teams of tax advisors and accountants devoted to crafting tailored avoidance strategies—efforts that are regularly covered in the media. One vivid illustration of the open nature of tax avoidance came during the 2016 presidential debate between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. When Clinton implied that Trump had paid no federal income tax in certain years, he quickly interjected, “That makes me smart” (Taylor, 2016). In subsequent interviews, Trump further defended his actions, stating, “as a businessman and real estate developer, I have legally used the tax laws to my benefit,” and, “I fight like hell to pay as little as possible” (CNN, 2015).

Growing public awareness of tax avoidance by the wealthiest may undermine tax compliance among the broader population. The behavior of the rich may serve as a reminder that others can also exploit similar—or different—loopholes, or it may shift social norms to make avoidance seem more acceptable. We designed a natural field experiment to test this hypothesis.

In our field experiment, we study a particular form of tax avoidance: property tax appeals, also known as tax protests. Filing an appeal is a legal means by which households can reduce the amount they pay in property taxes. Property taxes are based on the market value of a home, which, unless the home has been sold recently, can be difficult to determine precisely. Households can leverage the subjective nature of home valuations when filing a tax appeal to argue that their homes are worth less than the assessed value. A majority of these appeals are successful, and can save households hundreds of dollars per year (Nathan et al., 2025).

Property tax appeals provide an ideal setting for our research for three reasons. First, unlike other forms of tax avoidance—such as offshore sheltering—that are accessible only to the very wealthy, property tax appeals are available to all homeowners, regardless of income or wealth. Second, like other forms of tax avoidance, property tax appeals are far

more common among the wealthiest households. For example, only 8% of households with homes valued at \$200,000–\$249,000 filed an appeal in 2021 in Dallas County, compared to 49% of the richest-1% of households (with homes valued above \$1.9 million). Third, because property tax records are publicly available and easily accessible, we can provide participants with accurate information about appeals and also track their tax avoidance behavior.

We conducted our experiment in Dallas County, Texas, due to the logistical advantages of conducting a field experiment in a single location. With a population of approximately 2.6 million in 2020, as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, Dallas County is Texas’s second-largest county and surpasses the population of 15 U.S. states. The county showcases significant diversity across various dimensions, including ethnicity, and boasts a balanced mix of Democrat and Republican supporters. Moreover, property tax appeals operate in much the same way in this context as they do in many others (Dobay et al., 2019; World Bank, 2019).

Our research design isolates two distinct mechanisms through which learning about the prevalence of tax avoidance might influence an individual’s decision to engage in similar behavior: observational learning (Cai et al., 2009) and social norms (Deutchman et al., 2025). The observational learning channel posits that when individuals discover others are avoiding taxes, they may update their beliefs about the potential savings they themselves could achieve, thereby increasing the perceived benefit of tax avoidance. The social norms channel suggests that learning others are engaging in tax avoidance may lessen the personal guilt associated with such behavior, making individuals more likely to follow suit. Our experiment was specifically designed to disentangle these two causal mechanisms. Moreover, our research design allows to distinguish between vertical comparisons—whether individuals are influenced by the behavior of the wealthiest households—and horizontal comparisons—whether they are influenced by behavior of households with homes of similar values.

Our experimental design is structured as follows. We mailed invitation letters to a sample of households to participate in an online survey a few weeks before the property tax appeal filing deadline. The survey had an embedded information-provision experiment. We linked survey responses with administrative records from the county assessor’s office at the household level. This integration enabled us to provide customized information treatments to each household. Additionally, it allowed us to measure how the information randomized in the survey influenced their subsequent decisions to file a tax appeal.

The survey is structured around three key beliefs. The first concerns the share of the richest-1% of households—with homes worth over \$1.9 million—that file tax appeals. For brevity, we refer to this as the *richest-1% appeal rate*. The second belief focuses on the share of households that file an appeal among those with home values within the same \$50,000 bracket as the respondent. Hereinafter, we refer to these similar households as *comparable*

households and to this belief as the *comparable appeal rate*. The third belief addresses the expected annual property tax savings from filing an appeal, which we refer to as the *expected savings*. This belief serves a dual purpose: first, it allows us to isolate the observational learning channel; second, it provides a monetary benchmark for interpreting the magnitude of the effects of the other two beliefs.

By isolating variation in posterior beliefs that arises solely from randomly assigned information, we can credibly estimate the causal effect of these beliefs on the decision to file a tax appeal. The experiment is structured as follows. The survey begins by eliciting prior beliefs about the richest-1% appeal rate, the comparable appeal rate, and the expected savings. We then cross-randomize the provision of accurate feedback related to each belief. For instance, each respondent has a 50% chance of receiving information about the actual richest-1% appeal rate. Because the feedback is cross-randomized, respondents may receive information about all, some, or none of the three beliefs. After the information-provision stage, we elicit posterior beliefs.

We can measure how the information provision affects posterior beliefs, and also whether it affected the household’s decision to file an appeal—measured using administrative records. Additionally, we draw on survey outcomes to provide direct tests of the underlying causal mechanisms. The observational learning channel predicts that when households learn the richest-1% appeal more often, they may infer that appealing is a smart strategy and revise their expectations about their own potential tax savings. We can test this hypothesis by examining whether information about the richest-1% appeal rate affects respondents’ expected savings. And the social norms channel predicts that learning the wealthiest appeal more often may increase the moral views on appealing. To test this hypothesis, we included a question eliciting the household’s view on the acceptability of tax appeals.

To further examine individuals’ attitudes toward tax appeals and other forms of tax avoidance, we conducted a complementary survey of 600 Americans, hereinafter referred to as the *Attitudes Survey*. We elicited perceptions of the acceptability of nine types of tax avoidance, including property tax appeals, as well as three forms of tax evasion. Respondents rated the general acceptability of these behaviors and their acceptability when undertaken by the richest-1% and the poorest-1%, separately. And to further examine individuals’ attitudes, our field experiment included a revealed-preference measure of the acceptability of tax appeals. We inform participants that the researchers can assist a household with filing a tax appeal, and ask whether they wish to allow or prevent this assistance. We use a price-list method to elicit willingness to pay—either to enable or to block assistance—and measure it separately when the help is directed to a household in the richest-1% and when it is directed to a household in the poorest-1%.

We mailed the invitations to the field experiment in April 2022, a few days after the window to file tax appeals had opened but around three weeks before it closed. We mailed invitations to 100,615 households, 3.9% of which responded to our survey—a response rate that is slightly higher than benchmarks (Sinclair et al., 2012; Nathan et al., 2025). Our baseline sample consists of 3,681 respondents who completed the survey and passed some basic filters. Before any adjustments from tax appeals, the average subject owned a home valued at \$448,000 and had to pay \$9,700 in property taxes for that year. Homeowners can choose to appeal their taxes directly—which is the primary outcome—but they can also hire an agent to appeal on their behalf too. For context, 45.5% of homeowners in the control group—those who answered the survey but did not receive any informational interventions—appealed directly in 2022. The subject pool resembles the overall population of homeowners across many characteristics, but it overrepresents individuals with a higher propensity to file a tax appeal.

We begin by summarizing the results of the Attitudes Survey. We find that the three forms of tax evasion have the lowest acceptance ratings, averaging between 0.6 and 1.0 on a scale from 0 (completely unacceptable) to 3 (completely acceptable). In contrast, the acceptability of tax avoidance behaviors varies widely: profit shifting is viewed most similarly to evasion (with an average score of 1.3), while the most accepted form—avoiding consumption taxes through substitution—scores 2.4 on average. Property tax appeals ranks 4th among the nine types of tax avoidance, with a score of 2.3.

A second finding from the complementary survey is that each type of tax avoidance or evasion is consistently rated as substantially less acceptable when undertaken by someone in the richest-1% compared to someone in the poorest-1%. For instance, the average acceptability score for a property tax appeal is 1.9 when filed by a household in the richest-1%, compared to 2.5 when filed by a household in the poorest-1%. This wealth-based gap also emerges in our revealed-preference measure from the field experiment. A very small minority of subjects (4.2%) were willing to pay \$30 to prevent helping a household in the poorest-1% file a tax appeal. In contrast, a much larger share (32.7%) were willing to pay \$30 to prevent helping a household in the richest-1%.

Next, we present results from the information-provision experiment. We document substantial misperceptions across all three beliefs elicited in the survey. Specifically, most households either underestimate or overestimate the average appeal rate of the richest-1%, the average appeal rate of comparable households, and the average savings of comparable households. We also show that when provided with accurate information, households significantly update their posterior beliefs in the direction of the information—indicating that respondents were attentive and regarded the information as both relevant and credible. Lastly, we

estimate the causal impact of beliefs on the likelihood of filing a tax appeal using a Two-Stages-Least-Squares (2SLS) model that leverages the exogenous variation in beliefs induced by the randomized information treatments (Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2022).

We begin by summarizing the effects of the belief about expected savings, because it serves as natural benchmark for interpreting the rest of the results. We find that higher expected benefits from appealing have a positive, statistically significant, and economically meaningful effect on the subsequent probability of filing a tax appeal. Specifically, each additional \$100 in expected savings raises the probability of appeal by 1.30 percentage points (pp), or 2.8% relative to the baseline rate. This result aligns with basic economic theory—individuals respond to financial incentives—and with prior quasi-experimental evidence (Nathan et al., 2025). This result is robust across model specifications and withstands multiple falsification checks—most notably, an event-study analysis around the date of the intervention.

We now turn to the effects of the belief concerning the richest-1% appeal rate. When individuals believe that the richest-1% appeal more often, perceived unfairness about the wealth gap in appeal rates rises significantly. This finding is consistent with the evidence noted above that people show less tolerance for avoidance among the wealthiest households. However, while it heightens the sense of unfairness, the belief about the appeal rate of the richest-1% does not significantly increase the household’s own likelihood of filing a tax appeal. We find a coefficient that is negative, which is the opposite sign as predicted by the contagion hypothesis, close to zero (-0.034) and statistically insignificant. That is, a 1 pp increase in the perceived share of the richest-1% who file a tax appeal lowers the probability of filing a tax appeal by an insignificant 0.034 pp.

We argue that, based on the 90% confidence interval, this represents a relatively precise null. To support this, we benchmark the upper bound against the effects of the belief about expected savings and the treatment effects reported in other information-provision experiments conducted in the same context. However, we should not base conclusions on a single coefficient. We leverage alternative outcomes and the treatment arm for horizontal comparisons. All of this evidence, summarized below, reinforces the conclusion that perceptions about the richest-1% appeal rate have no effect on the decision to file a tax appeal.

For horizontal comparisons, the two underlying channels—observational learning and social norms—predict effects in the same direction as vertical comparisons. In other words, perceiving a higher appeal rate among comparable households should increase a household’s own likelihood of appealing. In fact, one may even expect horizontal comparisons to have stronger effects. Observational learning could be more influential when the observed behavior comes from households with comparable homes, to the extent that their appeals are perceived to better capture the individual’s own costs and benefits from appealing. Moreover,

to the extent that individuals compare themselves more with peers than with distant groups (Festinger, 1954; Clark and Senik, 2010), social norms may be shaped more strongly by the behavior of comparable households than the richest-1%. Yet, we find that the estimated effects of the perceived appeal rate of comparable homes are close to zero, statistically insignificant, and precisely estimated. The absence of contagion from comparable homes thus reinforces the conclusion that there is also no contagion from the richest-1%.

Using alternative outcomes, we can provide more direct tests for the observational learning and social norms channels. Against the prediction of the observational learning channel, we find that increasing perceptions about the richest-1% appeal rate does not affect a household’s own expected tax savings—a null effect estimated with high precision. Likewise, learning that the comparable appeal rate is higher does not change an individual’s own expected tax savings. For the social norms channel, we leverage a survey measure of injunctive norms—whether the respondent believes tax appeals are always justifiable. While the perceived appeal rate of the richest-1% does not influence a household’s own moral view of tax appeals, we find mixed results for the perceived appeal rate of comparable households.

To evaluate how surprising our findings might be, we conducted a forecast survey with a sample of 84 experts, primarily professors with publications in related topics.¹ These experts received an explanation of the experiment and were asked to predict the causal effects of each of the three beliefs. A majority (66%) forecasted that beliefs about expected tax savings would positively influence the likelihood of filing an appeal, which aligns with our experimental results. There was an even stronger consensus among experts (70%) that the belief about the appeal rate of the richest-1% would have a positive effect on appeal rates, which contrasts with the null effects we find. And an even stronger majority (76%) predicted positive effects for the belief about the appeal rate of comparable homes, which also goes against our null finding.

We also discuss how our findings may generalize to other contexts. To the extent that property taxes and appeals operate similarly in other U.S. states and countries, the results may apply there as well. However, some limitations should be noted. Our sample overrepresents households predisposed to appeal, which could bias the results toward stronger effects. For the null effects, though, this potential upward bias would only reinforce the conclusion. Generalizability may also vary by context. For example, we argue that our setting provides ideal conditions for the observational learning channel; therefore, the absence of evidence for this channel here suggests it is likely insignificant elsewhere. On the other hand, since tax appeals tend to be considered acceptable, the social norms channel could play a larger role in other, more complex or stigmatized forms of tax avoidance.

¹ For more details about the design and results of the expert survey, see Appendix B.

Our study contributes to several strands of literature. First, it relates to the growing body of research on tax avoidance and evasion among the wealthy. A substantial literature documents how the richest individuals employ a wide range of strategies to avoid taxes. For example, Smith et al. (2019) shows that the use of tax-preferred corporate forms is heavily concentrated at the top of the income distribution. Alstadsæter et al. (2019) shows that offshore tax evasion is overwhelmingly driven by the ultra-wealthy. Kleven et al. (2013) demonstrates that top earners engage in cross-border migration to minimize their tax burden. As a result of increased tax avoidance at the top of the distribution, effective tax rates—despite progressive tax schedules—end up being far less progressive than intended. In fact, some estimates suggest that the ultra-rich pay lower effective tax rates than the average American (ProPublica, 2023; Zucman, 2024).

While abundant evidence documents the extent of tax avoidance among the wealthiest individuals, our contribution is to examine whether this behavior affects tax compliance in the broader population. We show that the public is broadly aware of the higher prevalence of tax appeals among the richest-1% of households and generally disapproves of it. Yet, our results indicate that such perceptions do not translate into higher levels of tax avoidance in the general population.

Our study also relates to and contributes to the literature on network effects in tax compliance. A growing body of evidence shows that tax evasion choices can spread through word of mouth within social networks—primarily via tax preparers (Chetty et al., 2013; Boning et al., 2020; Battaglini et al., 2020; Brown et al., 2025), but also through other channels such as neighbors (Drago et al., 2020; Cruces et al., 2022), relatives (Alstadsæter et al., 2019), and coworkers (Bergolo et al., 2020).² The existing work focuses on word-of-mouth transmission. For instance, sending a letter with a tax enforcement threat to one taxpayer has been shown to increase compliance among their untreated neighbors (Drago et al., 2020; Cruces et al., 2022). The standard interpretation is that the recipient warns their neighbors about the audit threat, thereby influencing the neighbors’ compliance behavior. Similarly, the literature argues that individuals may receive tax evasion or avoidance tips from their accountants, relatives, or coworkers. We contribute to this literature by examining two causal mechanisms—observational learning and social norms—that remain underexplored. Specifically, we hypothesize that, even absent word-of-mouth transmission, the mere awareness of others’ tax avoidance can shape an individual’s own decision to avoid taxes, either by

² There is also evidence of related network effects that, while not directly involving tax evasion, pertain to taxation. For example, Wilson (2022) shows that earned income tax credit claiming behavior can spread through Facebook friend networks.

signaling that avoidance is beneficial or by shifting the individual’s moral views.³

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional context. Section 3 describes the design and implementation of the field experiment and the complementary survey. Section 4 presents the results on attitudes towards tax avoidance. Sections 5 and 6 presents the results of the field experiment. The last section concludes.

2 Institutional Context

2.1 Dallas County

We conducted the field experiment in Dallas County, one of the largest counties in the United States, encompassing 17 cities with a combined population of about 2.6 million in 2022 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2021). Dallas is ethnically diverse, relatively balanced in political orientation (Nathan et al., 2025), and, like much of the country, characterized by pronounced inequality in home values—home to both several billionaires and a wide swath of low-income households. We use administrative data provided by the Dallas Central Appraisal District (DCAD).⁴ The data from the DCAD includes information on ownership (e.g., name and address of the owner), property characteristics, and current and historic tax information including property taxable value, tax amounts and history of tax appeals.

2.2 Property Taxes

Property taxes fund various public services provided by its various jurisdictions (e.g., cities or school districts within the county) and the county itself (e.g., community colleges). The tax amount depends on the assessed property value, jurisdictional tax rates, and applicable household exemptions. Most importantly, households can apply to classify their primary residence as a homestead which, among other benefits, limits annual increases in assessed value to 10%. This is by far the most common exemption, with the vast majority of subjects in our sample claiming it.⁵

³ More broadly, our study relates to the growing literature on the drivers of tax morale; see Luttmer and Singhal (2014) and Slemrod (2019) for reviews. Recent examples include Cullen et al. (2021), who show that compliance is higher when taxpayers trust the government in power; Giacobasso et al. (2025), who find that compliance rises when taxpayers believe they benefit from government spending; and Nathan et al. (2023), Ajzenman et al. (2024), and Best et al. (2025), who examine how fairness perceptions affect compliance.

⁴ Appraisal districts in Texas are a political subdivision from the State of Texas responsible from appraising property for the purpose of taxable value assessment.

⁵ There are other exemptions, that freeze the portion of property taxes allocated to school funding, such as the exemption for individuals older than 65 and the disability exemption, but they are uncommon in our sample (2.27% and 1.65% of subjects, respectively).

2.3 Tax Appeals

The DCAD assesses the value of all taxable property within the county as of January 1 each year, resulting in what is known as the *proposed value*. These proposed values are made publicly available in mid-April on the DCAD’s website and are also mailed to some homeowners.⁶ One important feature of this setting is the subjectivity involved in valuing a home. For recently sold properties, the sales price provides a clear benchmark. However, for homes that have not sold in some time, estimating their value requires some guesswork. Assessor offices often use statistical models—similar to those used by private companies like Zillow or Redfin—to determine assessed values. In fact, rather than conducting the analysis in-house, many assessor offices hire firms that specialize in real estate data. These models, however, have limitations—for example, they do not account for every observable characteristic of a home. A clear indication of their imprecision is the frequent discrepancy between different estimates. For example, Zillow and Redfin often provide significantly different valuations for the same home (Nathan et al., 2025); and homes often sell for more or less than what these models predict. As a result, proposed values are inherently ambiguous and subjective, making them vulnerable to challenges by homeowners seeking to reduce their tax burden.

Once homeowners are notified of the latest proposed value, they have one month to decide whether to file an appeal. Homeowners can choose to appeal on their own, either by filing an online form or by mailing a physical form.⁷ Homeowners can also choose to hire an agent to appeal on their behalf.⁸ When appealing, homeowners may argue that the proposed value exceeds the market value of their home.⁹ Homeowners can share supporting evidence for their appeal, and they can also share their “Opinion of Value” which is how much they believe their property is truly worth. The DCAD then reviews the arguments for the appeal and may offer a settlement reducing the proposed value by email or phone. If the homeowner does not accept the settlement offer or the DCAD does not offer a settlement, the appeal moves to a hearing—for more details, see Nathan et al. (2025).

Since property taxes are calculated by applying the tax rate to a home’s assessed value, one would expect that lowering the assessed value would immediately reduce the tax bill. However, for households with a homestead exemption, tax savings in the first year are not

⁶ Notifications are sent to households with increases in proposed values, changes in ownership, or other relevant updates. For a sample of the official notification letter, see Appendix H in Giacobasso et al. (2025).

⁷ Nathan et al. (2025) shows that in 2020, about 75% of direct appeals were filed online and 25% by mail.

⁸ There is an industry of agents who help with property tax appeals in Texas. These agents charge flat fees or a percentage of the tax savings.

⁹ Homeowners may also argue that comparable houses in their district have been assigned lower proposed values, resulting in unfair taxation. More rarely, they appeal arguing the existence of errors in property characteristics (e.g., incorrect square footage).

guaranteed. Under the Texas property code, the assessed value of a homestead property cannot increase by more than 10% per year—a threshold commonly referred to as the homestead cap. This cap can create a sharp discontinuity in the expected marginal tax savings from filing an appeal. For households without a homestead cap, a successful appeal that lowers the proposed value directly reduces the taxes owed. For households with homestead status, the effect depends on whether the cap is binding. If the homestead cap is not binding—the proposed value falls below the homestead cap value—any marginal reduction in the proposed value will result in a corresponding reduction in the tax bill. But when the homestead cap is binding, a marginal reduction in the proposed value will have no impact on the amount of taxes owed during the first year.¹⁰

As in other forms of tax avoidance (Landier and Plantin, 2017; Tyger and Eastman, 2019; Alstadsæter et al., 2022), tax appeals are significantly more prevalent among wealthier individuals. For example, the average appeal rate is 8% for a typical household (with a home valued \$200,000–\$249,000), compared to 49% for households in the richest-1% (with homes valued over \$1.9 million). This disparity may stem from several factors. First, the expected financial benefit from tax avoidance is greater for high-income households, giving them stronger incentives to engage in such behavior.¹¹ Second, wealthier individuals tend to be more educated and financially sophisticated, which may make them more aware of tax appeals and better equipped to navigate them. Third, access to tax agents may play a significant role, as high-income households are more likely to use them.¹²

3 Experimental Design and Implementation

3.1 Subject Recruitment

We mailed recruitment letters timed to arrive just as Dallas County homeowners became eligible to file tax appeals. Each letter contained a unique survey code and a URL that recipients could use to participate in the study.¹³ The unique survey code allowed us to personalize their survey and link their responses to administrative property tax records. To incentivize participation, we promised subjects we would provide step-by-step instructions on

¹⁰ For more details about how the homestead cap works, see Nathan et al. (2025).

¹¹ Conversely, the opportunity cost of time associated with managing tax appeals could be greater for wealthier households too.

¹² For instance, 2.12% of houses in the 50th percentile in 2022 appealed using an agent, while 10.7% of households in the richest-1% appealed using an agent.

¹³ When a property was jointly owned by multiple individuals, usually spouses, we mailed one letter listing all owners.

filing appeals online upon completing the survey.¹⁴ In addition to serving as an incentive to participate, providing all subjects with instructions on how to appeal helps level the playing field: whether subjects appeal or not will depend more on whether they *want* to appeal and less on whether they know how to.

We provide copies of the envelope in Appendix C and the letter in Appendix D. These materials included several features designed to increase the legitimacy of our study. First, we sent the letters on behalf of researchers at the University of Dallas, a well-known institution in Dallas County. Second, the envelope featured the logo of the University of Dallas, the name of a professor from that university, and non-profit organization postage. Third, the letter included a physical address for the researcher and a link to the study’s website.¹⁵ Fourth, we provided contact information for the researchers and the Institutional Review Board. Fifth, the letter and the envelope included each recipient’s name and address. Finally, the letter also mentioned the recipient household’s proposed value and estimated property tax amount for 2022.

3.2 Survey Design

In this section, we summarize the main features of the survey. The full survey instrument is attached as Appendix F. The main module can be split in three steps, which are summarized as follows:

- **Step 1:** We elicit the three prior beliefs. The first belief is about the richest-1% appeal rate in the previous year (2021). To make sure the subjects understand the question, we explain that the richest-1% are defined as homes valued at \$1.9 million or more, and we provide pictures of a sample of three homes from this group (reproduced in Panel A of Figure 1). The second belief concerns the comparable appeal rate in the previous year (2021). We defined comparable homes as those assessed by the county within the same \$50,000 value range. For example, homes comparable to one assessed at \$233,000 would be those assessed between \$200,000 and \$249,999. The third belief pertains to the expected tax savings (in dollars) in the previous year (2021).
- **Step 2:** In the information-provision stage, we randomize information related to each of the three beliefs. More precisely, we use the administrative data to calculate the actual richest-1% appeal rate in 2021, the comparable appeal rate in 2021, and the expected

¹⁴ This walkthrough was the same as the one provided in Appendix D of Nathan et al. (2025), with minor updates for the year 2022. Nathan et al. (2025) provides evidence that such instructions can significantly increase the likelihood that a household files a tax appeal.

¹⁵ See Appendix E for a screenshot of the website.

savings in 2021. We cross-randomize subjects to receive each of the three pieces of information with a 50% probability for each. In other words, individuals are randomly assigned to one of eight treatment groups: one-eight receives no information (which we refer to as the pure control group), one-eight receive information about the expected savings only, ..., and one-eight receives all three pieces of information. We make the randomization explicit to subjects to avoid spurious updating. Specifically, we informed them that some participants would be randomly selected to receive information while others would not, and then either provided the information or notified them that they would not receive any.

- **Step 3:** We elicit the three posterior beliefs. We present all subjects with three questions similar to those in Step 1. Following Cavallo et al. (2017), and to avoid asking the exact same question twice, we frame the prior beliefs and feedback around the previous year (2021) and the posterior beliefs around the current year (2022). For the first posterior belief, we ask subjects to forecast the richest-1% appeal rate in 2022. For the second posterior belief, we ask them to forecast the comparable appeal rate in 2022. For the third posterior belief, we ask subjects to forecast the tax savings they would personally receive if they filed a tax appeal in 2022. We focus on their own expected savings because this is the most relevant factor for their decision. For example, a household may acknowledge that others achieve high tax savings from filing an appeal, yet still anticipate low savings for itself due to special circumstances—such as a binding homestead cap.

The goal of the experiment is to document whether the information shocks induced by the experiment affected posteriors beliefs, and most importantly, whether the shocks subsequently affected the probability of filing a tax appeal, measured via administrative records.

The effect of the information treatments may depend critically on the subject’s prior beliefs. Subjects with accurate beliefs should not update their beliefs when they are provided with accurate information. Those who underestimate their expected savings or the appeal rate of other households may update their beliefs upward, while those who overestimate may adjust their beliefs downward. Thus, providing information to subjects will have heterogeneous effects depending on the individual’s priors. By measuring prior beliefs before the information-provision stage, our research design allows us to accommodate heterogeneous updating. Following other studies (see, e.g., Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2022; Giacobasso et al., 2025), we employ a Two-Stages-Least-Squares (2SLS) model that estimates the causal effect of beliefs while allowing for heterogeneity by prior beliefs.

The main outcome of interest is whether the household subsequently filed an appeal, as

recorded in administrative data. In addition, we included a few survey questions—elicited after the information-provision stage—that can serve as secondary outcomes aimed at probing the underlying causal mechanisms. Respondents were asked how likely they were to file an appeal this year, on a 1–4 likelihood scale. This outcome may be able to pick up short-term effects on the intention to appeal, even if those intentions do not translate into actual appeals. We also asked respondents to evaluate the fairness of the observed wealth gap in appeal rates. Specifically, the question restates the subject’s posterior beliefs about the richest-1% appeal rate and the comparable appeal rate, and asks whether they view this as fair or unfair on a scale from 0 (very unfair) to 10 (very fair). The goal of this outcome is to assess whether the information treatments shifted perceptions of fairness. A final survey question asks, right after asking whether the household plans on filing a tax appeal, how justifiable it is to, “lawfully reduce your tax bill if you have a chance.” This question was designed to probe the social norms mechanism, which posits that learning others are appealing may make such behavior feel more justifiable.¹⁶ Lastly, the end of the survey included a battery of questions on demographics such as gender, age, ethnicity, education level, and political party.

3.3 Revealed-Preference Measure of Acceptability of Tax Appeals

One module of the survey included a revealed-preference measure of the acceptability of tax appeals. We build on prior research showing that, due to significant hassle costs, providing households with step-by-step instructions substantially increases the likelihood of filing an appeal (Nathan et al., 2025). To assess whether participants view appeals as acceptable, we informed them that researchers could assist a household with filing a tax appeal and asked whether they wished to allow or prevent this assistance.

Specifically, we used an iterative multiple price list (iMPL), implemented separately for a household in the richest-1% and one in the poorest-1%, randomizing the order of these two questions to avoid potential order effects. To ensure households understand the composition of each of these two groups, each question includes three pictures of actual homes from that group—for reference, Panel A of Figure 1 shows the sample pictures for the richest-1% homes, while Panel B shows the corresponding pictures for the poorest-1%.

We explained to subjects that the researchers were considering sending detailed information to a household from the group, enabling them to appeal effortlessly if they wished.

¹⁶ There are a few caveats regarding the question used in the field experiment. First, we used the term “lawfully” when describing the behavior, which may have led respondents to view it as more acceptable. Second, we did not explicitly mention tax appeals, only stating “to lawfully reduce your tax bill if you have a chance.” However, because this question immediately followed one asking whether the respondent planned to file a tax appeal in the coming year, we assume most subjects understood we were referring to tax appeals given the context.

In practice, the help we provided was the same as in the field experiment by Nathan et al. (2025), which was shown to significantly increase the likelihood of an appeal. In one question, we asked subjects whether they wanted the researchers to help or not help a property owner randomly selected from the richest-1%. The other question was identical, except it referred to a property owner randomly selected from the poorest-1% instead of the richest-1%. In each question, subjects first had to choose whether they wanted the researchers to provide or withhold help. If they chose to help, we used the iMPL to elicit how much they were willing to pay to *provide* assistance. If they chose to withhold help, we used the iMPL to elicit how much they were willing to pay to *prevent* the household from receiving assistance.

The iMPL consists of a sequence of paired choices presented dynamically (Holz et al., 2024). Consider, for example, a subject who indicates a desire to help a household in the poorest-1% file a tax appeal. The first choice is between providing that help or receiving a \$15 bonus. The second choice depends on the first. If the subject chooses to help the homeowner, the second decision is between helping or receiving a \$24 bonus. If the subject in the first decision instead chooses the bonus, the second decision is between helping or receiving a \$6 bonus. We continue increasing or decreasing the bonus amount based on previous responses until the difference between the final two amounts is \$3 or the subject reaches the maximum bonus amount of \$30. For subjects who prefer to withhold help, the structure is slightly different. The initial choice is between providing help along with a \$15 bonus, or receiving no bonus (and thereby withholding help). Subsequent paired choices adjust the bonus amount up or down following the same logic as above. The complete decision trees for the iMPL method are shown in Figure A.1. For each of the two scenarios—one involving the poorest-1% and one involving the richest-1%—the resulting willingness to pay (WTP) falls into one of 22 intervals: $(-\infty, -30)$, $(-30, -27)$, ..., $[-3, 0]$, $[0, 3]$, ..., $(27, 30]$, and $(30, \infty)$ —positive values indicate a willingness to pay to provide help, while negative values indicate a willingness to pay to withhold it.

To ensure consequentiality, we selected one in every 100 subjects and implemented one of their decisions at random. At the start of this module, we reminded subjects that they might be selected and that one of their decisions could be implemented. Because of this potential for real-world consequences—unlike typical surveys that rely on stated preferences—our design elicits revealed preferences. This is particularly important in our context, as concerns about fairness are often inflated when choices carry no personal cost (Levitt and List, 2007), presumably because of social desirability bias (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017).¹⁷

¹⁷ For example, in the context of tax preferences, Ajzenman et al. (2024) show that wealthy households express support for a more progressive tax schedule, but when real stakes are involved, they fail to put their money where their mouth is.

3.4 Subject Pool

We mailed survey invitations to 100,615 unique households. This sample was drawn from the universe of 430,175 non-commercial, owner-occupied residential properties in Dallas County that paid property taxes in both 2020 and 2021. To construct the sample, we applied a set of basic filters—for example, restricting to single-family homes and excluding households in the richest-1% and the poorest-1%—and then randomly selected 100,615 households from the remaining list.¹⁸

We timed our letters to arrive before the appeal deadline so that subjects would have time to respond to the information we provided. We created the letters immediately following Dallas County’s posting of the 2022 proposed values on April 18, 2022, and mailed them shortly afterward. Subjects began to respond to our survey and visit the study website on April 22. A total of 4,174 participants started the survey, and 4,005 finished the key module—that is, they responded to all three posterior beliefs. This response rate of 3.9% is slightly higher than those reported in previous studies in this context (Nathan et al., 2025; Giacobasso et al., 2025). On average, respondents took 9.7 minutes to complete the survey. Toward the end of the survey, we included an attention check similar to those used in prior work (Giacobasso et al., 2025), which 91.8% of respondents passed—a high rate in general, and especially given that the check appeared at the very end, when respondent fatigue was likely at its peak.

As explained in the RCT pre-registration, we dropped responses that could not be excluded ex-ante because of data availability. We dropped 122 subjects who, according to the DCAD’s records, had already filed an appeal before starting our survey, meaning that it was too late for any information included in the survey to affect their decisions to appeal. Similarly, we exclude 93 subjects who responded to the survey after the deadline to file an appeal, for whom it was too late for any information included in the survey to affect their appeal decisions.

We also exclude observations with outlier beliefs. Extreme prior beliefs are probably not true misperceptions but the result of misunderstanding the question, making a typo, or not paying close attention to the task at hand. To reduce sensitivity to outliers, we follow the standard practice in information-provision experiments and drop respondents with extreme prior misperceptions (see e.g., Fuster et al., 2022; Bottan and Perez-Truglia, 2025).¹⁹ In our

¹⁸ We excluded the richest-1% because a key goal is to understand how other households respond to their behavior. We exclude the poorest-1% because one of the survey questions involved them as well.

¹⁹ Moreover, extreme prior misperceptions may introduce attenuation bias in the 2SLS estimates. For example, consider an individual with an approximately accurate prior belief who appears to have an extreme misperception due to a typo (e.g., omitting a zero) when answering the question. We would not expect this individual’s choices to be influenced by the provision of accurate information, as they already knew the information to begin with.

baseline specification, we use a conservative definition of outliers that excludes 116 subjects based on their prior misperceptions.²⁰ After applying these filters, 3,681 respondents remain, forming our main subject pool. Because these exclusions are based on pre-treatment variables (e.g., prior beliefs), they should not compromise the validity of the experimental variation.

3.5 Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Balance

Column (1) of Table 1 provides some descriptive information about the subject pool. The average age is 47, around 42% of respondents are female, 55% are White, and 49% (33%) self-identify as Democrat (Republican). The average subject has a home assessed in about \$448,000 and pays a property tax amount of about \$9,700. Around 87% of the subject pool received a homestead exemption.²¹ Moreover, given the rapid growth in home prices during this period, it is not uncommon for homestead caps to be binding. Specifically, 66.21% of the households had a binding homestead cap—that is, they were granted a homestead exemption and their appraised value had increased by more than 10% since the previous year.

Our main outcome of interest is whether the household filed a direct appeal in 2022.²² Approximately 45% of control households filed a direct tax appeal that year. Households could also hire a tax representative to file an appeal on their behalf: an additional 7.4% of control households did so. As outlined in the RCT pre-registration, the focus of this paper is on direct appeals, since our intervention is unlikely to affect agent-filed appeals. Among other reasons, the information was provided to owners rather than agents, so we would not expect effects on agent appeals—for further discussion, see Nathan et al. (2025) and Giacobasso et al. (2025).

Columns (2) through (9) of Table 1 display the average baseline characteristics of each treatment.²³ For each of these pre-treatment characteristics, column (10) reports the p-value of a test of the null hypothesis that the averages are the same across all treatment groups. Table 1 shows that, consistent with successful random assignment, the observable characteristics are balanced across treatments.

In terms of observable characteristics (e.g., home value, number of bedrooms, or tax rate), the subject pool is similar to the universe of households in the county. Differences between survey respondents and non-respondents are statistically significant but small (see

²⁰ For more details on the classification of outliers, see Appendix A.6. And Appendix A.8 presents the results without excluding outlier misperceptions.

²¹ The high prevalence of the homestead exemption arises mechanically from the fact that we invited only households with owner-occupied homes.

²² The appeal variable is based on data downloaded from the DCAD website on July 19, 2022.

²³ Some characteristics, such as the gender of the respondent, are asked after the information-provision stage. However, treatment assignment should not affect these responses.

Appendix A.1). However, one significant difference is that, relative to the universe of households, respondents to the survey are substantially more likely to file an appeal. This pattern is consistent with Nathan et al. (2025) and Giacobasso et al. (2025), who used similar recruitment strategies in this setting. This pattern is most likely due to the design of our letter, which describes tax appeals, so subjects considering filing an appeal in 2022 are likely to pay attention to the letter and thus also likely to notice the survey link included in the letter. Indeed, our invitation letter promised participants that the end of the survey included instructions on how to file an appeal. Moreover, by reducing procedural barriers, the appeal instructions provided at the end of the study may have increased the likelihood that survey respondents ultimately filed an appeal (Nathan et al., 2025).

3.6 The Attitudes Survey

We designed the Attitudes Survey to provide additional evidence on the acceptability of tax avoidance and evasion. A sample of the survey instrument appears in Appendix G. To keep the survey of a reasonable length, each subject saw a battery of questions for each of five forms of tax behavior.²⁴ One of those behaviors is always property tax appeals. Another three are chosen at random from a set of eight different tax avoidance strategies: tax deferral through retirement accounts, buy-borrow-die, harvesting tax losses, real estate depreciation, carried interest, corporate profit shifting, tax avoidance through substitution and duty free stores. And another behavior is chosen at random from three tax evasion strategies: under reporting income, paying workers under the table, and falsifying deductions or expenses.

The five tax scenarios are presented in random order. For each scenario, we begin with a simple explanation of how the tax behavior works, typically illustrated with a concrete example that is accessible even to those with no prior expertise. Subjects are then asked to rate the acceptability of the behavior on a 0–3 scale, ranging from completely unacceptable (0) to completely acceptable (3). After evaluating its general acceptability, we ask about its acceptability when the behavior is undertaken by a household in the poorest-1%, and then again when it is undertaken by a household in the richest-1%. Recognizing that visuals can enhance communication compared to text alone (Perez-Truglia and Yusof, 2024), we present three sample photos each of homes in the poorest-1% and richest-1% groups.²⁵ The survey concludes with some questions about the subject’s familiarity with the forms of tax behavior, whether they engaged themselves in each of these behaviors, and a standard battery

²⁴ Because of the random assignment, the same survey instrument does not include every possible behavior a subject might have been shown. The full list of behaviors and their definitions appears in Table A.4.

²⁵ The six photos are of homes in Dallas County and are the same images used in the field experiment. While cost of living varies across geographic areas and these homes may not be representative elsewhere, it would have been impractical to present a different set of images depending on the respondent’s location.

of demographic questions.

4 The Social Acceptability of Tax Avoidance

4.1 Results from the Attitudes Survey

We recruited 600 respondents for the Attitudes Survey via Prolific, on March 13, 2025.²⁶ We limited eligibility to U.S. homeowners.²⁷ A great majority (83.33%) of subjects found the questions easy to understand, and 99.33% of the subjects passed our attention check.²⁸ Figure 2 presents the key results. Panel A presents the results for acceptability of each of these behaviors in general.²⁹ The most important takeaway is that while tax evasion behaviors are on average less accepted than tax avoidance, there is a wide range of acceptability across the different forms of tax avoidance. In other words, while technically all forms of tax avoidance are legal, some of them are more acceptable than others. We find that the three forms of tax evasion have the lowest acceptance ratings, averaging between 0.6 and 1.0 on a scale from 0 (completely unacceptable) to 3 (completely acceptable). Some forms of tax avoidance, particularly those employed by big corporations or the ultra-wealthy, have low acceptability that are not far from the acceptability of tax evasion: corporate profit shifting, carried interest, and buy, borrow, die have an acceptability in the range of 1.3–1.4. Property tax appeals ranks fourth out of the nine types of tax avoidance, with a score of 2.3, ranking below tax avoidance through substitution, purchases from duty free stores, and tax deferral through retirement accounts.

While Panel A of Figure 2 shows the overall acceptability of each form of behavior, Panel B presents the acceptability separately for cases in which the behavior is undertaken by a household in the poorest-1% versus the richest-1%. For some tax behaviors, these results should be interpreted with caution, as the question referring to the poorest-1% may be a stretch—certain behaviors, such as buy-borrow-die or profit shifting, are realistically beyond the reach of the poorest households. With that caveat in mind, the pattern is consistent across all forms of tax behavior: acceptability is lower when the behavior is undertaken by a household in the richest-1% than when it is undertaken by a household in the poorest-1%.

²⁶ For a comparison of average subject characteristics between this survey and the field experiment, see Appendix A.4.

²⁷ To be able to compare responses between Texas and the rest of the country, we over-sampled responses from Texas: we collected 157 responses from Texas and 443 from other states.

²⁸ Çelebi et al. (2025) discuss the challenges posed by AI agents responding to surveys and show that, although these agents may threaten survey quality, they currently pose only a limited risk on Prolific. Additionally, at the end of the survey, we included an additional question designed to detect respondents who might be using Artificial Intelligence—see Appendix A.4.

²⁹ In both panels, the tax behaviors are ordered by their mean general acceptability from Panel A.

Take, for example, property tax appeals—one of the behaviors for which the comparison is most meaningful, since both poor and wealthy households can, and often do, appeal their property taxes. For appeals, the average acceptability scores are 1.86 for the richest-1% versus 2.51 for the poorest-1%, a difference that is large (0.65 points) and statistically significant ($p\text{-value} < 0.001$). Moreover, this wealth-based gap in acceptability is not only directionally consistent but also quantitatively similar across all other forms of tax avoidance and evasion. In sum, this evidence suggests that individuals are less willing to tolerate tax avoidance when it is carried out by the rich than by the poor.

4.2 Revealed-Preference Evidence on Acceptability of Tax Appeals

The results from the Attitudes Survey presented above are subject to the usual caveats associated with survey data, such as social desirability bias (Edwards, 1957). For instance, respondents may claim to view tax avoidance by the rich as unfair simply because they believe that is the socially appropriate view to express, even if they privately hold a different opinion. To address these concerns, we next present revealed-preference evidence on the matter, based on the subjects from the field experiment. The magnitudes are not directly comparable between the Attitudes Survey and the field experiment due to differences in subject recruitment and methodology. Nevertheless, the results are qualitatively consistent: there is strong support for appeals by households in the poorest-1%, but markedly less tolerance for appeals by households in the richest-1%.

The detailed results for the willingness to pay results are presented in Figure 3. Panel A displays households' willingness to provide or withhold help from another household in the poorest-1%, while Panel B displays the corresponding willingness to help a household in the richest-1%. In each panel, positive values indicate a willingness to pay to help someone else file a tax appeal, while negative values indicate a willingness to pay to prevent the help from occurring. The rightmost and leftmost bars are $\geq \$30$ and $\leq -\$30$ by construction, because \$30 was the maximum reward amount offered to subjects in the experimental design. The middle category, \$0, corresponds to subjects who were approximately indifferent as to whether to provide or prevent the help—more precisely, cases in which the willingness to pay is less than \$3 in absolute value.

While there is high acceptance of tax appeals when filed by a household in the poorest-1% (Panel A of Figure 3), that acceptance is markedly lower when filed by a household from the richest-1% (Panel B). Specifically, while 85.3% of respondents were willing to pay \$30 to help a household from the poorest-1% file an appeal, that share drops sharply when it

comes to helping the wealthy: only 32.0% were willing to pay the same amount to help a household from the richest-1% file an appeal.³⁰ At the other end of the spectrum, whereas 4.2% of respondents were willing to pay \$30 or more to prevent help to a household in the *poorest-1%*, a substantially larger share (32.8%) were willing to pay that amount to prevent help to a household in the *richest-1%*.

Lastly, there is substantial variation across subjects in their willingness to help others file a tax appeal. A simple comparison, presented in Table A.5, shows that—perhaps strikingly—whether a subject is willing to help a household from the richest-1% or the poorest-1% is largely unrelated to the subject’s own wealth. However, there are notable differences along other dimensions, such as partisanship.³¹

5 Prior Beliefs and Belief Updating

5.1 Accuracy of Prior Beliefs

We find substantial misperceptions across all three beliefs elicited in the survey. We start with Panel A of Figure 4, which shows the distribution of misperceptions about the richest-1% appeal rates—that is, the difference between the share of richest-1% of households who actually filed a tax appeal in the previous year (i.e., the feedback provided in the experiment) and the subject’s own prior belief about this share. For reference, the correct answer was 49%. We find large misperceptions. Only a small group (9.07%) guessed the appeal rate of the richest-1% within 5% of the truth. The mean absolute error shows that, on average, prior beliefs were off by 29.16 pp. Moreover, these misperceptions were somewhat skewed: on average, subjects overestimated the richest-1% appeal rate by 8.49 pp.

Panel A of Figure 5 shows the distribution of misperceptions about the comparable appeal rate. The correct answer to this question depends on the subject’s home value bin—for instance, for homes valued at \$200,000–\$249,999, the correct answer is 8%.³² There are large misperceptions about the comparable appeal rate too. By one metric—the wisdom of the crowds—individuals are less informed about the comparable appeal rate than about the richest-1% appeal rate. On average, subjects overestimate the comparable appeal rate by 19.65 pp, whereas they overestimate the richest-1% appeal rate by only 8.49 pp.

Furthermore, we can assess more directly whether people are aware of the gap in appeal

³⁰ Our expert forecast survey also included two questions related to these questions on willingness to pay—see Appendix B for more details.

³¹ Specifically, Table A.5 shows that while Democratic and Republican subjects are about equally likely to want to help households from the poorest-1%, Republicans are substantially more likely to want to help households from the richest-1%.

³² Feedback for subjects in all other bins is provided in Table A.2.

rates between the richest-1% and comparable homes. The richest-1% are far more likely to file an appeal. For example, for the average respondent, the appeal rate is 49% for the richest-1% compared to 8% for comparable homes—a difference of 41 pp. On the one hand, households overestimate the richest-1% appeal rate by 7 pp, suggesting a general awareness that the wealthiest appeal at high rates. On the other hand, households also overestimate the comparable appeal rate by 18 pp. As a result, the average household underestimates the wealth gap in appeal rates by approximately 11 pp. In sum, although some households underestimate and others overestimate, on average they recognize that the richest-1% file appeals at much higher rates than comparable households.

One heuristic that typically does a good job at explaining misperceptions is extrapolation. Just to mention one example, when asked about the salary of co-workers, individuals tend to report their own salary as their best guess (Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2022).³³ According to this heuristic, if subjects were extrapolating from their own situation, they should be better at guessing about comparable homes than about the richest-1%. The fact that guesses about the richest-1% are similarly accurate—or even more accurate—than guesses about comparable homes suggests that households have some access to information about the appeals of the richest-1%, such as through news coverage. Another possibility is that individuals inferred that the wealthiest appeal more often for various reasons, such as having more to gain from an appeal or greater access to professional assistance.

Panel A of Figure 6 shows the distribution of misperceptions about expected savings—that is, the difference between the *actual* savings for comparable households in the previous year (i.e., the feedback provided in the experiment) and the subject’s prior belief. The feedback depends on the subject’s home value bin—for instance, for homes valued at \$200,000–\$249,999, the feedback was \$322. For reference, these \$322 in savings represent about 6.34% of the average tax bill in this bracket.³⁴ The mean absolute error shows that, on average, prior beliefs were off by \$721.³⁵ Misperceptions were also skewed: on average, subjects overestimated the savings by \$591. That is, on average, subjects believed the potential savings were twice as large as they actually are.³⁶

Since the question on expected savings is cognitively more demanding, we acknowledge that some of these misperceptions may arise from the complexity of the belief being elicited.

³³ There is evidence of this heuristic in a broad set of contexts such as perceived tax rates (Nathan et al., 2023) and perceived relative income (Cruces et al., 2013).

³⁴ Feedback for subjects in all other bins is provided in Table A.2.

³⁵ The results already exclude outliers. Including them would mechanically inflate the degree of misperception reported here. However, we believe that would be misleading, as those subjects likely did not understand the question in the first place.

³⁶ We caution that this overestimation may be less pronounced in the general population. If individuals who expect to save more from filing an appeal are more likely to respond to our survey, those who overestimate their savings would be mechanically overrepresented in our sample.

We were careful in how we worded the question and conducted small pilots to fine-tune the language. Despite these efforts, it is possible that some subjects misinterpreted the question. For example, some subjects might have responded about the expected savings conditional on a successful appeal, rather than the unconditional expectation we intended. Even so, the fact that a strong majority of subjects reported beliefs of the correct order of magnitude suggests that they understood the question.³⁷

5.2 Belief Updating

For each of the three beliefs we study, individuals update their beliefs substantially when provided with accurate information through the experiment. To quantify the degree of belief updating, we adopt the framework commonly used in other information-provision studies (e.g., Cavallo et al., 2017; Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2022; Giacobasso et al., 2025). Let subscript i denote individuals and subscript t denote the current year (2022) and $t - 1$ denote the previous year (2021). Define $w_{i,t-1}^{prior}$ as individual i 's prior belief about the richest-1% appeal rate in 2021. Let $w_{i,t-1}^{feed}$ be the piece of information being randomly assigned—the actual share of richest-1% households who filed an appeal in 2021. In our experiment, this variable does not require a subscript i because the feedback was not personalized—however, we retain the subscript i to accommodate the more general case in which it could be. Let $w_{i,t-1}^{post}$ denote the posterior belief about the richest-1% appeal rate in 2021, which we do not measure in the survey (to avoid asking the same question twice) but define here for the sake of the framework. And let $w_{i,t}^{post}$ be the posterior belief about the richest-1% appeal rate in 2022. Analogously, we define $c_{i,t-1}^{prior}, c_{i,t-1}^{feed}, c_{i,t-1}^{post}, c_{i,t}^{post}$ for beliefs about the comparable appeal rate and $s_{i,t-1}^{prior}, s_{i,t-1}^{feed}, s_{i,t-1}^{post}, s_{i,t}^{post}$ for beliefs about the expected savings.

We assume that firms form their future expectations by projecting their perceptions about the past. For example, in the case of the belief about the richest-1% appeal rate:

$$w_{i,t}^{post} = \mu + \theta^w \cdot w_{i,t-1}^{post}, \quad (1)$$

where $\theta^w > 0$ captures the degree of pass-through from past to future beliefs: that is, for each 1 pp increase in an individual's perceived 2021 appeal rate of the richest-1%, his or her expected 2022 appeal rate for the richest-1% rises by θ^w pp. For the beliefs about comparable appeal rate, θ^c would capture the extent to which individuals extrapolate the share of comparable homes that appealed in the past year to the share they expect will

³⁷ A more significant misinterpretation would be to report the expected reduction in the proposed property value rather than the expected reduction in tax savings. In that case, their responses would be in a different order of magnitude—tens of thousands of dollars instead of hundreds. However, because such individuals would not even get the order of magnitude right, they would get excluded from the analysis under our definition of outliers—see Appendix A.5 for details.

appeal in the following year. For expected savings, θ^s would measure the extent to which subjects extrapolate from the average savings of comparable homes in 2021 to their *own* expected savings in 2022—that is, extrapolating jointly from past to future and from others to themselves.

Now we turn to the Bayesian updating. Let T_i^w be an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual was randomly chosen to receive the information about the richest-1% appeal rate in 2021 and 0 otherwise—for the other two beliefs, the corresponding indicator variables would be T_i^c and T_i^s . Think of the case when the individual receives the information ($T_i^w = 1$). Based on the assumptions of a Bayesian learning model with Gaussian distributions,³⁸ after observing the information the individual is expected to update the posterior belief as follows:

$$w_{i,t-1}^{post} = \alpha^w \cdot w_{i,t-1}^{feed} + (1 - \alpha^w) \cdot w_{i,t-1}^{prior}, \quad (2)$$

where $\alpha^w \in [0, 1]$ is the weight assigned to the new information relative to the prior belief, which depends on the relative accuracy of the prior belief relative to the accuracy of the signal. Likewise, α^c and α^s would be the corresponding learning rates for the beliefs about comparable appeal rates and expected savings, respectively. If we combine equations (1) and (2) we obtain the following expression:³⁹

$$\underbrace{w_{i,t}^{post} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior}}_{\text{Belief Update}} = \mu + \theta^w \cdot \alpha^w \cdot \underbrace{(w_{i,t-1}^{feed} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior})}_{\text{Prior Gap}} + (\theta^w - 1) \cdot w_{i,t-1}^{prior} \quad (3)$$

The key prediction from the model is that, for individuals who received information, the belief updates should be a linear function of the prior gaps. Intuitively, respondents who overestimated the true richest-1% appeal rate should revise their beliefs downward upon receiving feedback; those who underestimated it should revise upward; and those who were already accurate should exhibit no updating. Note also that the strength of this belief updating is given by the product of the two key parameters: the learning weight (α^w) and the degree of extrapolation (θ^w).

There is one potential issue with estimating equation (3) directly. In practice, individuals may update their beliefs in the direction of the feedback for spurious reasons, that is, even if they did not get to see the information. Simply being asked the same question twice may lead them to think more carefully, reconsider their earlier response, or correct typographical errors, all of which could move their second answer closer to the truth. To disentangle true

³⁸ These assumptions include that the priors and the signal are normally distributed, and the variance of the prior and the signal is independent of the prior's mean. See Section C of Cavallo et al. (2017) for further discussion.

³⁹ Specifically, equation (3) is obtained by plugging equation (2) into equation (1) and subtracting $w_{i,t-1}^{prior}$ from both sides.

learning from spurious learning, we estimate the following specification that leverages the randomized nature of the information provision:

$$w_{i,t}^{post} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \cdot T_i^w \cdot (w_{i,t-1}^{feed} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior}) + \gamma_2 \cdot (w_{i,t-1}^{feed} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior}) + \gamma_3 \cdot w_{i,t-1}^{prior} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (4)$$

Intuitively, the key parameter is γ_1 , which measures whether the slope between belief updates and prior gaps is stronger for individuals who received information ($T_i^w = 1$) than those who did not ($T_i^w = 0$).⁴⁰

Panel B of Figure 4 shows the updating results corresponding to the belief about the richest-1% appeal rate. For simplicity, this figure includes only individuals who either received no information or received information solely about the richest-1% appeal rate, thereby isolating the effect of that specific information. The x-axis shows the prior gaps, and the y-axis shows the belief updates. Even in the control group (who received no information), there is a positive and statistically significant association between belief updating and prior gaps, but small in magnitude. Indeed, pattern is commonly observed in information-provision experiments and typically attributed to spurious learning (e.g., Cavallo et al., 2017; Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2022; Giacobasso et al., 2025).⁴¹

The key takeaway from Panel B of Figure 4 is that genuine learning occurs: the association between belief revisions and prior gaps is much stronger among those who received the information (0.886) than among those who did not (0.177). The difference between the two slopes (0.709) is large and statistically significant. For simplicity, let's call the product of the treatment indicator and the prior gap the *information shock*. In a world where individuals fully trust the information ($\alpha^w = 1$) and fully extrapolate ($\theta^w = 1$), a 1 pp increase in the information shock would be expected to translate into a 1 pp belief update. In comparison, the difference between slopes implies that a 1 pp information shock leads to a 0.709 pp belief update, indicating that individuals react less than fully to the information shocks, though fairly close to it.⁴²

We also find strong updating for the other two beliefs, though with somewhat different magnitudes. Panel B of Figure 5 shows the learning results for beliefs about the comparable appeal rate. The difference in slopes between the treatment and control groups is large (0.709) and statistically significant (p-value<0.001). This degree of belief updating is exactly

⁴⁰ In practice, all subjects received identical feedback about the richest-1% appeal rate. Consequently, $(w_{i,t-1}^{feed} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior})$ and $w_{i,t-1}^{prior}$ are perfectly collinear, so controlling for one is sufficient.

⁴¹ However, in our application, because the prior and posterior beliefs refer to different periods, this pattern could be attributed to the extrapolation—specifically, a $\theta^w = 0.826$ would predict the observed slope of 0.174.

⁴² While this is true on average, updating can be highly heterogeneous, with some individuals update fully but others not updating at all, presumably because they are not paying attention—see Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2022) for a detailed discussion.

the same magnitude as the corresponding degree of updating for the richest-1%. A natural interpretation is that individuals hold equally strong priors about comparable homes as they do about the richest 1%.

Panel B of Figure 6 presents the learning results for beliefs about expected savings. Consistent with genuine learning, the difference in slopes between the treatment and control groups is large (0.446) and statistically significant (p-value=0.002). The degree of belief updating for expected savings (0.446) is in the same order of magnitude but somewhat smaller than for the other two beliefs (0.709). This lower degree of updating has an intuitive explanation: when updating their beliefs, households are extrapolating not only from the past year to the current year, but also extrapolating about comparable homes to their own household. As a result, households facing a binding homestead cap should be expected to extrapolate much less—or not at all. To illustrate this point, consider two identical households, A and B, both of which underestimated the average savings of comparable homes by \$100. After receiving accurate information, both households revise their posterior belief about the average tax savings of comparable homes upward by \$100. The difference is that household A faces a binding homestead cap, meaning a marginal reduction in the proposed value has no effect on the tax amount they owe this year, whereas household B does not. As a result, even though both households learn that others save \$100 more than they initially believed, household A may not update its own expected tax savings at all, or at least will update less strongly than household B. Consistent with this prediction, Appendix A.6 shows that the degree of belief updating is substantially stronger for households without a binding homestead cap than for those with one. Indeed, the degree of belief updating about tax savings among households without a binding homestead cap (0.696) is similar to the degree of updating documented above for the other two beliefs (0.709).

The evidence discussed above shows that when individuals receive information pertaining to one belief, they update the corresponding posterior belief. However, there could also be *cross-learning*, whereby information related to one belief influences other beliefs as well. We find limited evidence of cross-learning, suggesting that belief updating was largely compartmentalized—the corresponding results are presented in Section 6.7 and Appendix A.6.⁴³

⁴³ In two cases we find effects that are statistically significant, but quantitatively small: when individuals update their posterior beliefs about the richest-1% appeal rate, they slightly adjust their beliefs regarding the comparable appeal rates, and vice versa—see Appendix A.6 for more details.

6 Causal Effects of Information

6.1 Total Effects vs. Partial Effects

We aim to estimate the causal effects of each of the three posterior beliefs on the decision to file a tax appeal and other outcomes. To do so, we follow the same 2SLS approach used in other information-provision experiments (e.g., Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2022; Giacobasso et al., 2025), exploiting the exogenous variation in posterior beliefs generated by the randomized provision of information. There is, however, one methodological distinction from prior studies. In our research design, we expect the three beliefs to be potentially interrelated. For instance, when individuals receive information about the richest-1% appeal rate, they may update their posterior belief about that rate but also consider the information sufficiently relevant to revise their beliefs about their own expected tax savings. In other words, while other studies often treat cross-learning as a nuisance, in our design it plays a central role in understanding the causal mechanisms.

We distinguish between two effects of information, which we term the “total effect” and the “partial effect,” drawing an analogy to total and partial derivatives. The total effect of a piece of information encompasses both the impact through the direct belief plus any indirect effects operating through other beliefs. The partial effect, by contrast, isolates the direct impact after controlling for the indirect effects through other beliefs. For instance, suppose that after receiving accurate information about the richest-1% appeal rate, individuals change their choices partly because the information directly affects their belief about the richest-1% and partly because it indirectly alters their belief about their own expected savings. The partial effect captures only the direct impact on the belief about the richest-1%, while the total effect captures both the direct and indirect effects.

6.2 Econometric Model: Total Effects

We begin our analysis with the total effect of the belief concerning the richest-1% appeal rate. Our main outcome of interest, $P_{i,t}$, is an indicator variable equal to 100 for individuals who filed an appeal in 2022 (i.e., post-treatment) and 0 otherwise. While the following model is applicable to each of the three beliefs, for the sake of brevity, we focus on the belief about the richest-1% appeal rate. We seek to estimate a regression of $P_{i,t}$ on the posterior belief $w_{i,t}^{post}$. However, because posterior beliefs may be endogenous, such a regression would not necessarily identify the causal effect of that belief. To achieve causal identification, we employ a 2SLS model that exploits only the exogenous variation in posterior beliefs induced by the randomization of information. For the total effect, the relevant subsample consists of

individuals in two treatment groups: those who received information solely about the appeal rate of the richest-1% and those who did not receive any information. The specification of interest is:

$$P_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_w^{total} \cdot w_{i,t}^{post} + \beta_2 \cdot (w_{i,t-1}^{feed} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior}) + \beta_3 \cdot w_{i,t-1}^{prior} + X_i \beta_X + \nu_i \quad (5)$$

The endogenous variable is $w_{i,t}^{post}$, and the excluded instrument is $T_i^w \cdot (w_{i,t-1}^{feed} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior})$.⁴⁴ The vector X_i corresponds to a set of additional controls, which in the baseline specification corresponds to the priors and gaps of the other two beliefs.⁴⁵

We can illustrate the intuition behind the 2SLS model with a simple example. This model is based on the comparison between pairs of individuals with the same prior gap. For example, consider two individuals who both underestimate the richest-1% appeal rate by 10 pp. We then randomly assign information about the true richest-1% appeal rate to one of them. We would expect that, relative to the individual who does not receive the information, the individual who does will end up with a higher posterior belief about the richest-1% appeal rate. For the sake of argument, suppose the individual who did not receive the information continues to underestimate the actual richest-1% appeal rate by 10 pp, while the informed individual reacts strongly and now underestimates by only 2 pp. The information provision can thus be interpreted as a positive shock of 8 pp to the perceived richest-1% appeal rate. We can then examine how this 8 pp shift in posterior beliefs translates into differences in behavior—specifically, whether it leads to a higher probability of filing an appeal.⁴⁶

We can estimate the same model described above for the other two beliefs, using a specification analogous to equation (5) but with the corresponding variables for each belief.⁴⁷ When estimating the model for the belief about expected savings, there is one small difference in the specification. As discussed in Section 2 above, whether a household faces a binding homestead cap can play a major role in shaping how it updates its expectations about its

⁴⁴ Formally, the exogeneity assumption is $\mathbb{E} \left[\left(w_{i,t-1}^{feed} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior} \right) \cdot T_i^w \cdot \nu_i \mid W_i \right] = 0$ where W_i is the vector of control variables $\{w_{i,t-1}^{feed} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior}, w_{i,t-1}^{prior}, X_i\}$. In plain terms, to interpret the 2SLS estimate as the causal effect of the belief, we must assume that heterogeneity in the effects of information is driven solely by differences in prior misperceptions, and not by unobserved factors correlated with those misperceptions.

⁴⁵ In practice, the feedback about the appeal rate of the richest-1% was identical for all subjects. As a result, $(w_{i,t-1}^{feed} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior})$ and $w_{i,t-1}^{prior}$ are perfectly collinear, so it suffices to control for only one of them.

⁴⁶ For further discussion on this 2SLS model, see (Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2022). One caveat of the 2SLS estimate is that it identifies a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). In other words, it captures the average effect of beliefs among individuals whose posterior beliefs changed as a result of the information experiment. Thus, by construction, the 2SLS estimate places greater weight on individuals with larger prior misperceptions and, conditional on those misperceptions, on those who respond more strongly to the feedback.

⁴⁷ Each 2SLS model is estimated with a different pair of treatment groups. For instance, the model for the belief about the comparable appeal rate is estimated using individuals who either did not receive any information or received only information about the comparable appeal rate.

own tax savings. Thus, allowing for this heterogeneity in the first stage can improve the asymptotic mean squared error of the 2SLS estimator (Abadie et al., 2024). Specifically, let H_i be an indicator variable for whether household i has a binding homestead cap. We follow the fully-interacted method from Abadie et al. (2024), allowing for interactions of H_i with the excluded instrument.⁴⁸

Our first hypothesis is that $\beta_w^{total} > 0$: if individuals increase the perceived richest-1% appeal rate, they will be more likely to file an appeal themselves, potentially due to social norms or observational learning. Similarly, we hypothesize that $\beta_c^{total} > 0$: if individuals increase the perceived comparable appeal rate, they will also be more likely to file an appeal, again possibly due to social norms or observational learning. Finally, we hypothesize that $\beta_s^{total} > 0$: increasing a household's expected savings will make them more likely to appeal, as individuals respond to pecuniary incentives. That is, if they expect an action to yield larger financial gains, they are more likely to take it.

6.3 Econometric Model: Partial Effects

To disentangle the causal mechanisms at play, we next focus on estimating the partial effects. For this purpose, we estimate a single regression that pools all eight treatment groups and includes all three beliefs simultaneously as right-hand-side variables:

$$\begin{aligned}
P_{i,t} = & \beta_0 + \beta_w^{partial} \cdot w_{i,t}^{post} + \beta_c^{partial} \cdot c_{i,t}^{post} + \beta_s^{partial} \cdot s_{i,t}^{post} + \\
& + \beta_1 \cdot (w_{i,t-1}^{feed} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior}) + \beta_2 \cdot (c_{i,t-1}^{feed} - c_{i,t-1}^{prior}) \\
& + \beta_3 \cdot H_i \cdot (s_{i,t-1}^{feed} - s_{i,t-1}^{prior}) + \beta_4 \cdot (1 - H_i) \cdot (s_{i,t-1}^{feed} - s_{i,t-1}^{prior}) + \\
& + \beta_5 \cdot w_{i,t-1}^{prior} + \beta_6 \cdot c_{i,t-1}^{prior} + \beta_7 \cdot H_i \cdot s_{i,t-1}^{prior} + \beta_8 \cdot (1 - H_i) \cdot s_{i,t-1}^{prior} + \\
& + \beta_9 \cdot H_i + X_i \beta_X + \nu_i
\end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

The endogenous variables are $w_{i,t}^{post}$, $c_{i,t}^{post}$ and $s_{i,t}^{post}$, and the excluded instruments are $T_i^w \cdot (w_{i,t-1}^{feed} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior})$, $T_i^c \cdot (c_{i,t-1}^{feed} - c_{i,t-1}^{prior})$, $H_i \cdot T_i^s \cdot (s_{i,t-1}^{feed} - s_{i,t-1}^{prior})$, and $(1 - H_i) \cdot T_i^s \cdot (s_{i,t-1}^{feed} - s_{i,t-1}^{prior})$. The coefficients $\beta_w^{partial}$, $\beta_c^{partial}$ and $\beta_s^{partial}$ are the three partial effects of interest. For example, $\beta_w^{partial}$ measures the effect of the belief about the richest-1% appeal rate while holding constant the other two beliefs—about the comparable appeal rate and expected savings. Relative to the total effects, the partial effects have the advantage of pinpointing

⁴⁸ More precisely, the endogenous variable is $s_{i,t}^{post}$, the excluded instruments are $H_i \cdot T_i^s \cdot (s_{i,t-1}^{feed} - s_{i,t-1}^{prior})$, $(1 - H_i) \cdot T_i^s \cdot (s_{i,t-1}^{feed} - s_{i,t-1}^{prior})$ and we control for $H_i \cdot (s_{i,t-1}^{feed} - s_{i,t-1}^{prior})$, $(1 - H_i) \cdot (s_{i,t-1}^{feed} - s_{i,t-1}^{prior})$, $H_i \cdot s_{i,t-1}^{prior}$, $(1 - H_i) \cdot s_{i,t-1}^{prior}$ and H_i .

the precise causal mechanisms at play.⁴⁹

Ex ante, whether total and partial effects differ depends on how individuals process information. The two effects will coincide if learning is *compartmentalized*—that is, when individuals update only the belief directly targeted by the information and ignore it when forming other beliefs. Ex post, as shown later, learning appears highly compartmentalized, so we would expect the partial and total effects to be similar. However, another possible source of divergence between total and partial effects is *information saturation*. In estimating the total effect, we compare individuals who received a single piece of information to those who received none. By contrast, the partial effect is identified among individuals who may have received two or three pieces of information simultaneously. If attention is limited, the impact of a given piece of information may be smaller when delivered alongside other messages.

6.4 Effect of Expected Savings

The 2SLS estimates are reported in Table 2. Panel A reports the total effects, while Panel B shows the partial effects. The specifications are identical across columns, except that each column uses a different dependent variable. In column (1), the dependent variable is our primary outcome of interest: an indicator for whether the subject filed an appeal in 2022, based on administrative data.

We begin by describing the effects of the belief about expected savings, as it serves as a natural benchmark for interpreting the remaining results. According to Panel A, which corresponds to total effects, the coefficient in column (1) on expected savings is positive (1.302), statistically significant (p-value = 0.022), and economically meaningful. This coefficient implies that a \$100 increase in expected savings increases the probability of appealing by 1.30 pp—equivalent to 2.8% of the baseline appeal rate. This result is consistent with basic economic theory: individuals respond to financial incentives. Moreover, this estimate is broadly consistent with evidence from Nathan et al. (2025), who provides related quasi-experimental evidence. Using a regression kink design, they show that a \$100 increase in expected tax savings raises the probability of appealing by 2.14 pp.⁵⁰ We would not expect the magnitudes to match exactly across the two studies, given differences in time periods, samples, and that each of the estimates are subject to statistical uncertainty. Nonetheless, the fact that the two estimates are directionally consistent and of the same order of magnitude (1.30 pp vs. 2.14 pp) provides reassuring evidence of the validity of our findings.

⁴⁹ As noted earlier, because the feedback about the appeal rate of the richest-1% was identical for all subjects, controlling for $(w_{i,t-1}^{feed} - w_{i,t-1}^{prior})$ makes it unnecessary to also control for $w_{i,t-1}^{prior}$. Also, we do not include any additional controls (i.e., X_i is empty) in the baseline specification, but we add them in alternative specifications for robustness checks.

⁵⁰ This estimate is reported on page 285 of Nathan et al. (2025).

We conduct several robustness checks for this estimate. The first is a falsification test that leverages the timing of the information intervention in an event-study framework. Specifically, we re-estimate the same regression but use appeals during each of the five previous years as the dependent variable. Intuitively, because the information was provided in 2022, it could not have influenced appeal decisions in any year prior to 2022. We therefore expect the coefficients from each falsification test to be close to zero and statistically insignificant. These event-study results are shown in the left panels of Figure 7. Panel A corresponds to the total effect of expected savings. The rightmost coefficient represents the post-treatment effect—the same coefficient of 1.302 from Table 2 discussed above. The remaining coefficients correspond to each of the pre-treatment years. As expected, the coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant for all pre-treatment years, while the coefficient for the post-treatment year is positive and statistically significant.

The right panels of Figure 7 present another robustness check using binned scatterplots. The 2SLS models described above assume that the effect of beliefs on behavior is linear. The belief-updating results discussed earlier suggest that the linear assumption is an excellent approximation for the first stage. However, the reduced-form relationship may deviate from linearity. For example, individuals may react asymmetrically to information—they might be more likely to appeal when expected savings increase but fail to change their behavior when expected savings decrease. There could also be other non-linearities or, more concerning, the results could be driven by outliers. To examine this possibility more closely, the right panels of Figure 7 shows the intention-to-treat effects of providing information using binned scatterplots. Specifically, Panel B corresponds to the effects of information shocks about expected savings.⁵¹ For brevity, this panel pools subjects with and without binding homestead caps, but Figure A.5 reports the results for the two groups separately. The results suggest that the findings are not driven by outliers or non-linearities.

While Panel A of Table 2 reports the total effects, Panel B reports the partial effects. Given that learning is highly compartmentalized, we would expect the total effects and partial effects to be similar to each other. Indeed, like the total effect, the partial effect is positive and statistically significant ($p\text{-value} = 0.005$). There are some differences, though. First, the partial effect is estimated more precisely than the corresponding total effect—this is largely mechanical, as the total effect is estimated using only two of the eight treatment groups, whereas the partial effect uses variation from all eight treatment groups. Second, in terms of magnitude, the partial effect (0.583) is roughly half the size of the total effect (1.302), but this difference must be interpreted cautiously, as it is statistically insignificant

⁵¹ More precisely, this panel is similar to Panel B of Figure 6, except that the y-axis reports the probability of appealing in 2022 rather than the posterior belief about expected savings.

(p-value=0.235).⁵² With that caveat in mind, one possible interpretation is information saturation: when individuals receive multiple pieces of information simultaneously, their attention may be divided, leading to a weaker response to any single piece.

We conduct a series of additional robustness checks. A common concern in 2SLS estimation is the possibility of weak-instrument bias (Stock et al., 2002; Andrews and Stock, 2005). However, the substantial belief updating documented earlier suggests that instrument strength is unlikely to be a problem in our setting. To formally assess instrument relevance, Table 2 reports the Kleibergen-Paap *rk* Wald F-statistics for each 2SLS regression, a standard diagnostic for weak instruments.⁵³ In all cases, these statistics exceed the conventional rule of thumb from Staiger and Stock (1997), which suggests that if the F-statistic is above 10, weak identification is not a concern.

Additional robustness checks are presented in Appendix A.8, which reports sensitivity analyses of the baseline specification. These include adding extra control variables, using alternative definitions of outliers, and excluding subjects who did not pass the attention check. The results remain qualitatively consistent and quantitatively similar across all alternative specifications.

Column (2) of Table 2 is identical to column (1), except that the dependent variable is the ex-ante intention to file an appeal, as measured in the survey data. More specifically, the dependent variable equals 1 for individuals who reported they would “almost surely” file an appeal in 2022 and 0 otherwise.⁵⁴ The correlation between the intention to appeal and actual appeals is far from perfect: in the control group, the correlation coefficient is 0.32. In other words, many individuals who say they will appeal ultimately do not, and conversely, some who say they will not appeal end up doing it. Given this low correlation, we would not expect the effects to be mechanically the same for actual appeals (column (1)) and intentions to appeal (column (2)). We do not find any significant positive effects on the intention to appeal. This suggests that while the information on expected savings ultimately influenced the decision to file an appeal, the effect may not have been immediate—individuals may have reflected on the information for days or weeks before it affected their final decision. An

⁵² We test the equality of two coefficients estimated in separate regressions using the same sample. Since the estimates come from different specifications, their sampling covariance is not observed; for tractability, we assume it is zero.

⁵³ Since the rule of thumb is derived under the assumption of homoskedastic errors, it would be technically appropriate to use the Cragg-Donald statistic, which is also derived under homoskedastic errors. However, we follow the recommendation of Baum et al. (2007): “the use of the *rk* Wald statistic, as the robust analog of the Cragg-Donald statistic, is a sensible choice and clearly superior to the use of the latter in the presence of heteroskedasticity.”

⁵⁴ The number of observations is slightly smaller in column (2) than in column (1) because a small share of subjects left the survey after the elicitation of posterior beliefs but before answering the question on intent to appeal.

alternative explanation is social desirability bias: when presented with information suggesting that filing an appeal is less profitable than expected, individuals might be reluctant to state that they no longer intend to appeal, as doing so could signal that they file appeals for selfish reasons rather than on principle.⁵⁵

Column (3) of Table 2 shows the effects on agent appeals, an outcome where we do not expect to find any effects. As expected, we find no significant effect of providing owners with information about expected savings on their likelihood of appealing through agents.⁵⁶ In turn, column (4) of Table 2 shows the effects on successful appeals. In other words, this outcome indicates whether the owner appealed directly *and* such appeal resulted in a reduction in the proposed value, and 0 otherwise. This measure allows us to assess whether the marginal appeals induced by the treatment were consequential. In both Panels A and B, the coefficient estimates in column (4) are similar to those in column (1) in terms of sign, magnitude, and statistical significance. Thus, the data suggest that the marginal appeals induced or discouraged by the information on expected tax savings were largely consequential.

6.5 Effect of Perceived Appeals by the Richest-1%

We now turn to the effects of the belief about the richest-1% appeal rate. Evidence from Section 4 suggests that individuals are less tolerant of tax avoidance by the wealthiest households. A natural starting point, therefore, is to examine whether learning that the wealthy appeal more frequently alters individuals' fairness perceptions. The results are presented in column (5) of Table 2. The dependent variable is the answer to the survey question on the fairness of the gap in appeal rates between richest-1% and comparable households, on a scale from 0 (very unfair) to 10 (very fair). The average fairness score is 4.8.⁵⁷ For easier interpretation, column (5) uses a standardized outcome.

The total effects, shown in Panel A of Table 2, are imprecisely estimated and statistically insignificant.⁵⁸ It is important to keep in mind that this is a subjective outcome, which is typically noisy and therefore produces less precise estimates. However, the partial effects, shown in Panel B, provide suggestive evidence that a larger perceived gap in appeal rates between the richest-1% and comparable homes reduces perceived fairness. More precisely, each 1 pp increase in the perceived appeal rate of the richest-1% *reduces* the fairness score

⁵⁵ For related evidence on social desirability bias in the context of tax preferences, see Ajzenman et al. (2024).

⁵⁶ Consistent with this evidence, prior experiments in the same context have found that information provided to owners affects owner appeals but has no impact on agent appeals (Nathan et al., 2025; Giacobasso et al., 2025; Nathan et al., 2023).

⁵⁷ For more details, see Figure A.7.

⁵⁸ The only exception is the coefficient on expected savings, which is positive and borderline significant in Panel A. However, since the corresponding coefficient in Panel B is near zero, precisely estimated, and statistically insignificant, we view the Panel A result as likely spurious.

by 0.005 standard deviations (p-value=0.003). Likewise, each 1 pp increase in the perceived appeal rate of comparable homes *increases* the fairness score by 0.006 standard deviations (p-value=0.008). By contrast, perceptions of expected savings have an effect on perceived fairness that is close to zero and statistically insignificant. This experimental result aligns with the evidence in Section 4, which shows that individuals are less tolerant of tax avoidance by the wealthiest households. However, as we demonstrate below, despite the effects on this survey outcome, there is no significant impact on the actual decision to file a tax appeal.

In column (1) of Table 2, the dependent variable is whether the individual filed a tax appeal. Panel A shows that the total effect of the richest-1% appeal rate is close to zero (-0.034), precisely estimated, and statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.810). This implies that a 1 pp increase in the appeal rate of the richest-1% would, if anything, *reduce* the subject’s own probability of filing an appeal by 0.034 pp. This null effect runs counter to the contagion hypothesis. However, before delving further into the magnitude of the coefficient, we first examine its robustness.

Panel C of Figure 7 presents the event-study analysis for the total effect of the richest-1% appeal rate. All pre-treatment coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant, which supports the validity of the post-treatment coefficient. Panel D of Figure 7 shows the intention-to-treat effects in binned scatterplot form. The null finding does not appear to be driven by non-linearities or outliers. The results of column (1) of Table 2 remain very similar across alternative specifications (see Appendix A.8) and are also null for the intention to appeal, agent appeals, and successful appeals (columns (2)–(4) of Table 2).

Panel B of Table 2 reports the partial effects. Because learning is highly compartmentalized, we expect small or no differences between the partial and total effects. Indeed, the coefficient for the partial effect remains close to zero (0.126) and statistically insignificant. On the positive side, the partial effect is more precisely estimated and, for this reason, may be preferred to the total effect. On the other hand, the event-study analysis for the partial effect shows some minor anomalies—see Appendix A.8 for details—and for this reason we prefer to focus on the total effect as the headline estimate.

Now that we have established the robustness of this finding, we can return to the discussion of its economic magnitude. The total effect of the wealthy appeal rate (-0.034, from Panel A, column (1) of Table 2) is not even directionally consistent with the hypothesis of trickle-down effects, which predicts positive effects. However, the fact that the coefficient is close to zero and statistically insignificant does not necessarily mean it is a precise null. To assess this, we examine the upper bound of the 90% confidence interval, which allows us to rule out effects larger than 0.199 at the 90% confidence level. This would be a modest effect: a 1 percentage point increase in richest-1% appeals would increase the probability of filing

an appeal by at most 0.199 pp.⁵⁹

One natural benchmark for this bound is the effect of expected savings. According to this upper bound, the effect of a 1 percentage point increase in richest-1% appeals would be, at most, equivalent to the effect of an \$15 increase in expected savings ($= \$100 \cdot \frac{0.199}{1.302}$). Another natural benchmark is Giacobasso et al. (2025), who study the effects of a belief which, like the richest-1% appeal rate, is also expressed as a share: the percent of property taxes that go to public schools. According to the reciprocity hypothesis, households with children—who benefit from school taxes—would be less likely to file a tax appeal when believing that a higher share of their taxes go to schools. Indeed, Giacobasso et al. (2025) report that, for a household with children enrolled in public schools, a 1 pp increase in the perceived share of property taxes going to public schools decreases the probability of appealing by 0.409 pp. By comparison, our estimate indicates that a 1 pp increase in the perceived share of richest-1% households appealing would increase the subject’s own probability of appealing by, at most, 0.199 pp.

One common concern about null effects in experiments is that participants may not be paying attention to the information provided. However, we find significant effects for the treatment on expected tax savings, indicating that participants are indeed attentive in this setting. Another potential concern is that tax appeal decisions may be influenced by information on pecuniary incentives but not by other types of information, such as those appealing to tax morale. Yet, evidence from other information-provision experiments conducted in the same context using similar methodologies suggests otherwise. For example, Giacobasso et al. (2025) show that informing households about how their tax dollars are spent—specifically, whether they fund services that benefit them, such as local public schools—significantly affects subsequent appeal rates. Similarly, Nathan et al. (2023) find that providing information about the tax rate paid by the average household in the county influences both perceived fairness and the likelihood of appealing. Taken together with these studies, our evidence suggests that it is the specific information about the appeal rates of the richest-1% that has no impact on filing decisions.

In any case, we should not draw conclusions based on a single coefficient. We use additional approaches to estimate trickle-down effects, relying on alternative dependent variables that capture the hypothesized causal mechanisms more directly. We also examine horizontal comparisons, since if vertical contagion existed, one might expect horizontal contagion as well. We present these additional results next, all of which reinforce the conclusion that perceptions about the appeal rate of the richest-1% have no effect on the decision to file a

⁵⁹ The conclusions would be similar if we used the partial effect from Panel B, where the upper bound of the 90% confidence interval is 0.268.

tax appeal.

6.6 Effect of Perceived Appeals by Comparable Homes

We next turn to the effects of the belief about the appeal rate of comparable homes. The two underlying channels—observational learning and social norms—predict effects in the same direction as those for vertical comparisons. In fact, there are reasons to expect horizontal comparisons to have even stronger effects than vertical comparisons.⁶⁰ People tend to compare themselves to their peers more than to other groups (Festinger, 1954; Clark and Senik, 2010), making them more likely to form social norms based on the behavior of comparable homes. Evidence from the context of salary comparisons illustrates this dynamic: employees tend to feel jealous when their colleagues earns a bit more than they do, but do not feel jealous when their boss earns far more (Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2022). Likewise, one may expect observational learning to be stronger when the observed behavior comes from households with similarly valued homes, as their tax appeals are more likely to reflect the individual’s own costs and benefits. Experts in our forecast survey echoed this logic, with most predicting that beliefs about comparable homes would have a greater effect on appeal decisions than beliefs about the richest-1%—for details, see Appendix B.

In column (1) of Table 2, the total effect (shown in Panel A) is close to zero (-0.054) and statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.730). This implies that a 1 pp increase in the appeal rate of comparable homes would, if anything, *reduce* the subject’s own probability of filing an appeal by 0.054 pp. Although small, the negative coefficient runs counter to the contagion hypothesis. Furthermore, all the robustness checks presented above for the richest-1% apply similarly to the coefficient on comparable homes. The total effect for the belief about comparable homes (-0.054) is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the corresponding coefficient for the belief about the richest-1% (-0.034). The event-study analysis shows no effect on pre-treatment outcomes (Panel E of Figure 7). The binned scatterplot indicates that the null effect does not seem to be driven by non-linearities or outliers (Panel F of Figure 7). The results remain very similar across alternative specifications (see Appendix A.8). There are also null effects for the intention to appeal, agent appeals, and successful appeals (columns (2)–(4) of Table 2). Given the compartmentalized learning, the partial and total effects should be similar. Indeed, like the total effect, the partial effect is also close to zero and statistically insignificant (Panel B of Table 2). In sum, the fact that we do not observe

⁶⁰ Of course, one could also argue the opposite. For example, if the wealthy are perceived as financially savvy, their decision to file appeals could amplify the observational learning response, signaling more strongly that appealing is a smart strategy. Likewise, learning that the wealthy appeal at high rates might trigger stronger moral judgment or even a sense of retaliation.

any effects from beliefs about comparable homes reinforces the conclusion that beliefs about the richest-1% also had no impact.

6.7 Direct Test of the Observational Learning Channel

We use posterior beliefs about households' own expected tax savings to directly test the observational learning channel. According to this channel, when individuals learn that the richest-1% appeal more often, they should infer that appealing must be financially advantageous and therefore raise their own expected savings. The same logic applies to horizontal comparisons: when individuals learn that comparable homes appeal more frequently, they should become more optimistic about their own expected savings.

The evidence is presented in Figure 8. This figure follows the same specification described earlier in Section 5.2, which we used to measure learning. However, while the previous section examined whether information about a belief led to updates about that same belief, Figure 8 measures *cross-learning*—that is, whether information about one belief led to updates in other beliefs. Specifically, Panel A compares two treatment groups: individuals who did not receive any information versus individuals who received only information about the appeal rates of the richest-1%. The x-axis represents the belief gap—whether the household underestimated or overestimated the appeal rates of the richest-1%. The y-axis, however, is *not* the belief update about the appeal rate of the richest-1% but rather the belief update about the household's own expected tax savings. The difference in slopes between treatment and control groups is close to zero (0.018) and statistically insignificant. This means that finding out that the richest-1% appeal rate is 1 pp higher than you thought increases the household's own expected savings by merely \$1.8. Moreover, this effect is estimated very precisely around zero. Using the upper bound of the corresponding 90% confidence interval, we can rule out, with 90% confidence, that when an individual finds out that the appeal rate of the richest-1% is 1 pp higher than expected, they increase their expected tax savings by at most \$8.3. This reflects a precisely bounded null effect.

Panel B of Figure 8 mirrors Panel A but focuses on horizontal comparisons rather than vertical comparisons. Even for horizontal comparisons, the degree of cross-learning is statistically insignificant and tightly estimated around zero. For example, based on the difference in slopes from Panel B, when finding out that the comparable appeal rate is 1 pp higher than expected, on average households increase their own expected savings by just \$4.7. And according to the corresponding confidence interval, we can rule out, with 90% confidence, effects above \$11.13. This is again a precisely estimated null. So, the fact that individuals do not *even* exhibit observational learning about comparable homes further reinforces the finding of no observational learning about the richest-1%.

6.8 Direct Test of the Social Norms Channel

Next, we explore the social norms channel. In social psychology (Deutchman et al., 2025), it is believed that individuals infer social approval (*injunctive* norms) from what they perceive others doing (*descriptive* norms). According to this social norms channel, when individuals observe that a high share of the richest-1% are appealing (the descriptive norm), they may feel it is more acceptable to file an appeal (the injunctive norm). To test this hypothesis, we use a question from the field experiment that directly asks individuals about their injunctive norms: i.e., whether they think tax appeals are acceptable. In the control group, 83.01% said tax appeals are always justifiable, 16.75% said they are sometimes justifiable, and only 0.24% deemed it never justifiable. While we did not use the same question in the Attitudes Survey and the Field Experiment, this relatively high acceptability of tax appeals is broadly consistent with the complementary evidence presented in Section 4.1 above.

The results are presented in column (6) of Table 2, which is identical to column (1) except that the dependent variable is now an indicator for whether the individual stated that tax appeals are always justifiable.⁶¹ The total effect of the belief about the appeal rates of the richest-1% is close to zero (0.111) and statistically insignificant. In other words, when households learn that the richest-1% are appealing more often, it does not change whether they view tax appeals as justifiable. When looking at the partial effect of this belief, the coefficient is also close to zero (0.090) and statistically insignificant. For horizontal comparisons, however, the results are mixed, as the partial effect is close to zero (0.053) and statistically insignificant, but the total effect is larger (0.262) and statistically significant (p-value=0.021). So, for horizontal comparisons, learning that peers appeal more often may have made appealing seem more acceptable, but the effect was likely too weak to significantly influence whether the subject ultimately chose to appeal.

7 Conclusions

Tax avoidance is widespread among the wealthiest individuals, and the public is increasingly aware of these practices. This growing visibility raises concerns that exposure to elite avoidance could erode tax compliance more broadly—either by highlighting replicable strategies or by normalizing avoidance as socially acceptable. We provide a test of this hypothesis using novel data. First, we use survey and willingness-to-pay data to show that people are substantially less accepting of tax avoidance when incurred by the most wealthy. Second, we use large-scale, pre-registered field experiment in Dallas County. When households find

⁶¹ While the question has a 3-point scale, given that virtually nobody chose the lowest point, we collapsed the variable into a simple indicator outcome, for ease of interpretation.

out that the wealthiest are more likely to file and appeal, it reduces their perceptions of fairness. However, updating beliefs about how common tax avoidance is among the wealthy does not increase the likelihood of appealing, nor does it shift beliefs about the financial or moral acceptability of appealing. Consistently, learning about the frequency of tax appeals among comparable households does not have effects either. By comparison, individuals who learn that appeals can yield substantial tax savings are significantly more likely to file. Taken together, these findings suggest that although the public disapproves of tax avoidance by the wealthy, their behavior does not trickle-down to the broader population.

A common consideration in any empirical study is the external validity of the findings. On the one hand, these results may be generalizable to other contexts. For example, to the extent that property tax appeals operate similarly in other Texas counties, as well as in counties outside of Texas (Dobay et al., 2019; World Bank, 2019; Nathan et al., 2025), the findings are likely to apply more broadly.⁶² On the other hand, there are some limitations worth noting. First, due to our recruitment strategy, our subject pool overrepresents households that were more inclined to file a property tax appeal. As a result, the effect sizes might have been smaller had we used a more representative sample. However, given that we document a null effect, this potential bias only strengthens our conclusion.

Another important consideration is that our study focuses on one specific form of tax avoidance—property tax appeals. The two mechanisms we study may be weaker or stronger for other types of tax avoidance. Indeed, our context arguably provides ideal conditions for observational learning. In other settings, the strategies used by the wealthiest individuals are often very different from those suitable for most Americans. For example, the buy-borrow-die strategy is sensible for individuals with vast stock wealth but is irrelevant for the vast majority of households. By contrast, the tax appeal process is identical for every household, regardless of wealth. Filing an appeal requires completing the same simple form, whether the home is worth \$50,000 or \$50 million. Since this context provides ideal conditions for observational learning, the absence of any evidence here suggests it is even less likely to occur in other settings beyond tax appeals. On the flip side, it could be argued that our context is not particularly favorable for the social norms channel. Although not everyone approves of tax appeals, baseline acceptance is already quite high, leaving limited room for acceptance to increase further. Thus, the social norms channel could play a larger role in other, more complex or stigmatized forms of tax avoidance or tax evasion. In any case, further research is needed to assess whether and how these effects generalize. In the terminology of List

⁶² There are exceptions, however—for instance, property tax appeals are relatively rare in California due to Proposition 13. Since a property’s assessed value is capped and only reassessed upon sale or major improvements, most long-time property owners pay taxes well below market value—giving them no incentive to file appeals.

(2020), we view our results as a Wave 1 insight—establishing initial causal relationships and providing first tests of theory.

Our findings have implications for tax transparency and communication strategies around tax policy. Recent efforts by researchers (e.g., Zucman, 2024), government agencies (Leiserson and Yagan, 2021), and non-governmental organizations (ProPublica, 2023) publicize the effective tax rates of the wealthy and the strategies they use to avoid taxes. A potential concern is that such publicity could unintentionally lower tax compliance among the broader population. Similarly, there is a concern that efforts to increase tax transparency—such as naming and shaming tax delinquents—could undermine tax compliance more broadly if they lead the public to believe that tax avoidance and evasion are more widespread than previously assumed (see e.g., Perez-Truglia and Troiano, 2018). While further research is needed, our evidence suggests that the unintended negative consequences of this increased transparency may be less severe than initially feared.

References

- Abadie, A., J. Gu, and S. Shen (2024). Instrumental variable estimation with first-stage heterogeneity. *Journal of Econometrics* 240(2), 105425.
- Ajzenman, N., G. Cruces, R. Perez-Truglia, D. Tortarolo, and G. Vazquez-Bare (2024). From Flat to Fair? The Effects of a Progressive Tax Reform. *NBER Working Paper No. 33286*.
- Alstadsæter, A., N. Johannesen, S. L. G. Herry, and G. Zucman (2022). Tax evasion and tax avoidance. *Journal of Public Economics* 206, 104587.
- Alstadsæter, A., N. Johannesen, and G. Zucman (2019). Tax Evasion and Inequality. *American Economic Review* 109(6), 2073–2103.
- Alstadsæter, A., W. Kopczuk, and K. Telle (2019). Social networks and tax avoidance: evidence from a well-defined norwegian tax shelter. *International Tax and Public Finance* 26(6), 1291–1328.
- Andrews, D. W. and J. H. Stock (2005). *Identification and inference for econometric models: Essays in honor of Thomas Rothenberg*. Cambridge University Press.
- Battaglini, M., L. Guiso, C. Lacava, and E. Patacchini (2020). Tax Professionals and Tax Evasion. *NBER Working Paper No. 25745*.
- Baum, C. F., M. E. Schaffer, and S. Stillman (2007). Enhanced routines for instrumental variables/generalized method of moments estimation and testing. *The Stata Journal* 7(4), 465–506.
- Bergolo, M., R. Ceni, G. Cruces, M. Giacobasso, and R. Perez-Truglia (2020). What Makes a Tax Evader? *NBER Working Paper No. 28235*.

- Best, M. C., L. Caloi, F. Gerard, E. P. Kresch, J. Naritomi, and L. Zoratto (2025). Greener on the other side: Inequity and tax compliance. *NBER Working Paper No. 34062*.
- Boning, W. C., J. Guyton, R. Hodge, and J. Slemrod (2020). Heard it through the grapevine: The direct and network effects of a tax enforcement field experiment on firms. *Journal of Public Economics* 190, 104261.
- Bottan, N. L. and R. Perez-Truglia (2025). Betting on the house: Subjective expectations and market choices. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 17(1), 459–500.
- Brown, J., S. Jilke, D. Schwegman, M. Toma, and M. C. Turner (2025). Improving tax compliance among the clients of tax preparers. *SSRN Working Paper No. 5400632*.
- Bursztyn, L. and R. Jensen (2017). Social image and economic behavior in the field: Identifying, understanding, and shaping social pressure. *Annual Review of Economics* 9, 131–153.
- Cai, H., Y. Chen, and H. Fang (2009). Observational learning: Evidence from a randomized natural field experiment. *American Economic Review* 99(3), 864–82.
- Cavallo, A., G. Cruces, and R. Perez-Truglia (2017). Inflation expectations, learning, and supermarket prices: Evidence from survey experiments. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 9(3), 1–35.
- Çelebi, C., C. Exley, S. Harris, H. Kivimäki, M. Serra-Garcia, and J. Yusof (2025). Mission possible: Data quality in online surveys.
- Chetty, R., J. N. Friedman, and E. Saez (2013). Using Differences in Knowledge Across Neighborhoods to Uncover the Impacts of the EITC on Earnings. *The American Economic Review* 103(7), 2683–2721.
- Clark, A. E. and C. Senik (2010). Who Compares to Whom? The Anatomy of Income Comparisons in Europe. *The Economic Journal* 120(544), 573–594.
- CNN (2015). Trump Unveils Tax Plan, Press Conference Transcript, aired September 28, 2015.
- Cruces, G., R. Perez-Truglia, and M. Tetaz (2013). Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a survey experiment. *Journal of Public Economics* 98, 100–112.
- Cruces, G., D. Tortarolo, and G. Vazquez-Bare (2022). Design of Two-Stage Experiments with an Application to Spillovers in Tax Compliance. *Working Paper*.
- Cullen, J. B., N. Turner, and E. Washington (2021). Political Alignment, Attitudes toward Government, and Tax Evasion. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 13(3), 135–66.
- Cullen, Z. and R. Perez-Truglia (2022). How much does your boss make? the effects of salary comparisons. *Journal of Political Economy* 130(3), 766–822.
- DellaVigna, S., D. Pope, and E. Vivalt (2019). Predict science to improve science. *Science* 366(6464), 428–429.
- Deutchman, P., G. Kraft-Todd, L. Young, and K. McAuliffe (2025). People update their injunctive

- norm and moral beliefs after receiving descriptive norm information. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 128(1), 1–18.
- Dobay, N., F. Nicely, A. Sanderson, and P. Sanderson (2019). The best (and worst) of international property tax administration. Technical report, Council On State Taxation.
- Drago, F., F. Mengel, and C. Traxler (2020). Compliance Behavior in Networks: Evidence from a Field Experiment. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 12(2), 96–133.
- Edwards, A. L. (1957). *The Social Desirability Variable in Personality Assessment and Research*. New York: Dryden Press.
- Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. *Human Relations* 7(2), 117–140.
- Fuster, A., R. Perez-Truglia, M. Wiederholt, and B. Zafar (2022). Expectations with Endogenous Information Acquisition: An Experimental Investigation. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 104(5), 1059–1078.
- Giaccobasso, M., B. Nathan, R. Perez-Truglia, and A. Zentner (2025, October). Where do my tax dollars go? Tax morale effects of perceived government spending. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 17(4), 223–59.
- Holz, J., R. Jiménez-Durán, and E. Laguna-Müggenburg (2024). Estimating the distaste for price gouging with incentivized consumer reports. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 16(1), 33–59.
- Kleven, H. J., C. Landais, and E. Saez (2013). Taxation and International Migration of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market. *American Economic Review* 103(5), 1892–1924.
- Landier, A. and G. Plantin (2017). Taxing the rich. *The Review of Economic Studies* 84(3), 1186–1209.
- Leiserson, G. and D. Yagan (2021). What is the average federal individual income tax rate on the wealthiest americans? *Council of Economic Advisers’ Blog, posted on September 23, 2021..*
- Levitt, S. D. and J. A. List (2007). What do laboratory experiments measuring social preferences reveal about the real world? *Journal of Economic perspectives* 21(2), 153–174.
- List, J. A. (2020). Non est disputandum de generalizability? A glimpse into the external validity trial. *NBER Working Paper No. 27535*.
- Luttmer, E. F. P. and M. Singhal (2014). Tax Morale. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 28(4), 149–168.
- Nathan, B., R. Perez-Truglia, and A. Zentner (2023). Paying Your Fair Share: Perceived Fairness and Tax Compliance. *NBER Working Paper No. 32588*.
- Nathan, B., R. Perez-Truglia, and A. Zentner (2025). My Taxes Are Too Darn High: Why Do Households Protest Their Taxes? *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 17(1), 273–310.
- Perez-Truglia, R. and U. Troiano (2018). Shaming Tax Delinquents. *Journal of Public Eco-*

nomics 167, 120–137.

Perez-Truglia, R. and J. Yusof (2024). Billionaire superstar: Public image and demand for taxation. *NBER Working Paper No. 32712*.

ProPublica (2023). America’s highest incomes and taxes, revealed. <https://projects.propublica.org/americas-highest-incomes-and-taxes-revealed/>. Accessed: 2024-09-18.

Sinclair, M., J. O’Toole, M. Malawaraarachchi, and K. Leder (2012). Comparison of response rates and cost-effectiveness for a community-based survey: postal, internet and telephone modes with generic or personalised recruitment approaches. *BMC Medical Research Methodology* 12(1), 132.

Slemrod, J. (2019). Tax Compliance and Enforcement. *Journal of Economic Literature* 57(4), 904–954.

Smith, M., D. Yagan, O. Zidar, and E. Zwick (2019). Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 134(4), 1675–1745.

Staiger, D. and J. H. Stock (1997). Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. *Econometrica* 65(3), 557–586.

Stock, J. H., J. H. Wright, and M. Yogo (2002). A survey of weak instruments and weak identification in generalized method of moments. *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics* 20(4), 518–529.

Taylor, J. (2016). Clinton and trump clash in tense first presidential debate. *NPR Politics*. Published Sept. 26, 2016.

Tyger, A. and S. Eastman (2019). The regressivity of deductions. *Tax Foundation Blog*. Accessed: 2024-10-25.

U.S. Census Bureau (2021). Population, Dallas County, Texas. <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/dallascountytexas/POP010220>.

Wilson, R. (2022). The Impact of Social Networks on EITC Claiming Behavior. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 104(5), 929–945.

World Bank (2019). The Administrative Review Process for Tax Disputes: Tax Objections and Appeals in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Zucman, G. (2024). Opinion: Global billionaires should pay more taxes. *The New York Times*, May 3. Accessed: 2024-09-18.

Figure 1: Sample Photos of Most and Least Expensive Homes

A. Richest-1% Homes




B. Poorest-1% Homes




Notes: Panel A displays the images of the top 1% most expensive houses shown to the participants. Panel B displays the images of the least expensive homes shown to participants. These photos were downloaded on February 15, 2022, from a sample of homes listed for sale on <http://www.redfin.com>.

Figure 2: Acceptability of Tax Avoidance/Evasion Strategies



Notes: This figure uses data from the Attitudes Survey. Panel A displays responses to the question “How acceptable do you believe it is to use [strategy] appeals to lower your taxes?” coded on a 0–3 scale from completely unacceptable (0) to completely acceptable (3). Panel B displays the responses to two questions, also coded on a 0–3 scale, that distinguish between the group that is engaging in the behavior: “How acceptable do you believe it is for the poorest-1% of households to use [strategy] to lower their taxes?” and “How acceptable do you believe it is for the richest-1% of households to use [strategy] to lower their taxes?”


Figure 3: Revealed-Preference Evidence on the Acceptability of Tax Appeals




Notes: Panel A displays the distribution of the willingness to pay to help a taxpayer from the poorest-1% of the house value distribution appeal their tax bill. Panel B displays the corresponding willingness to pay to help a taxpayer from the richest-1%. Positive values indicate a willingness to pay to help someone else file a tax appeal, while negative values indicate a willingness to give up money to prevent the help from occurring. The maximum reward was \$30 in the experimental design. Therefore, the rightmost and leftmost bars are $\geq \$30$ and $\leq -\$30$ by construction.

Figure 4: Appeal Rate of the Richest-1%: Prior Beliefs and Belief Updating

A. Prior Beliefs




B. Belief Updating




Notes: All results are based on two treatment groups: those who received information solely about the appeal rate of the richest 1% and those who did not receive any information. Panel A shows the gap in prior beliefs about the appeal rate of the richest-1%. The x-axis reports the difference between the actual richest-1% appeal rate and respondents' prior beliefs about the richest-1% appeal rate. The y-axis reports the percentage of homeowners in each bin. The upper left corner reports the total number of observations, the mean error, and the mean absolute error. Panel B shows how respondents update their beliefs using a binned scatterplot. The x-axis is the same as in Panel A. The y-axis reports the difference between posterior and prior beliefs (i.e., belief updating). Red circles (gray squares) represent the average update within each bin for the group of homeowners that were selected (were not selected) into the receiving information about the richest-1% appeal rate. Each line corresponds to the fitted values from a linear regression. The binned scatterplot include the following controls: the gap between the feedback and priors for the comparable appeal rates, the gap between the feedback and priors for tax savings interacted with a binding homestead cap and a non-binding homestead cap, and an indicator for whether the homestead cap binds. The coefficients associated with the gap variable are reported in the upper left corner, as well as their robust standard errors (in parentheses), the p-value of the difference in the slopes, and the number of observations included in the analysis.

Figure 5: Appeal Rate of Comparable Households: Prior Beliefs and Belief Updating




Notes: All results are based on two treatment groups: those who received information solely about the appeal rate of the comparable households and those who did not receive any information. Panel A shows the gap in prior beliefs about the appeal rate of comparable households. The x-axis reports the difference between the actual comparable appeal rate and respondents' prior beliefs about the comparable appeal rate. The y-axis reports the percentage of homeowners in each bin. The upper left corner reports the total number of observations, the mean error, and the mean absolute error. Panel B shows how respondents update their beliefs using a binned scatterplot. The x-axis is the same as in Panel A. The y-axis reports the difference between posterior and prior beliefs (i.e., belief updating). Red circles (gray squares) represent the average update within each bin for the group of homeowners that were selected (were not selected) into the receiving information about the comparable appeal rate. Each line corresponds to the fitted values from a linear regression. The binned scatterplot include the following controls: the gap between the feedback and priors for the richest-1% appeal rates, the gap between the feedback and priors for tax savings interacted with a binding homestead cap and a non-binding homestead cap, and an indicator for whether the homestead cap binds. The coefficients associated with the gap variable are reported in the upper left corner, as well as their robust standard errors (in parentheses), the p-value of the difference in the slopes, and the number of observations included in the analysis.

Figure 6: Expected Tax Savings: Prior Beliefs and Belief Updating



Notes: All results are based on two treatment groups: those who received information solely about the expected tax savings of comparable households and those who did not receive any information. Panel A shows the gap in prior beliefs about the expected savings. The x-axis reports the difference between the actual savings from appealing and respondents' prior beliefs about the expected savings. The y-axis reports the percentage of homeowners in each bin. The upper left corner reports the total number of observations, the mean error, and the mean absolute error. Panel B shows how respondents update their beliefs using a binned scatterplot. The x-axis is the same as in Panel A. The y-axis reports the difference between posterior and prior beliefs (i.e., belief updating). Red circles (gray squares) represent the average update within each bin for the group of homeowners that were selected (were not selected) into the receiving information about the expected savings. Each line corresponds to the fitted values from a linear regression. The binned scatterplot includes the following controls: the gap between the feedback and priors for the comparable appeal rates, and the gap between the feedback and the priors for the richest 1% appeal rates. The coefficients associated with the gap variable are reported in the upper left corner, as well as their robust standard errors (in parentheses), the p-value of the difference in the slopes, and the number of observations included in the analysis.


Figure 7: 2SLS Total Effects: Event-Study Analysis and Intention-to-Treat Binned Scatterplots




Notes: The left panels show event-study results on how posterior beliefs affect households' appeal probability (y-axis). The circles represent 2SLS estimates from Equation (5), with 90% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The vertical dashed line separates the post-treatment year (2022) from the pre-treatment years (2017-2021). The right panels show binned scatterplots of the intention-to-treat effects. Red circles represent treatment and gray squares control. The x-axes correspond to the difference between the observed value and the prior belief. Each line corresponds to an OLS binned scatterplot regression. Panel B controls for priors about the richest-1% and comparable homes, the comparable appeal rate information gap and whether the homestead cap is binding. Panel D controls for comparable home appeal rate priors and information gaps, and expected savings priors and information gaps interacted with whether the homestead cap is binding. Panel F controls for richest-1% appeal rate priors and information gaps, and expected savings priors and information gaps interacted with whether the homestead cap is binding.

Figure 8: Effects of Information about the Richest-1% and Comparable Appeal Rates on Expected Savings

A. Effect of Richest-1% Appeal Rate on Expected Savings



B. Effect of Comparable Appeal Rate on Expected Savings



Notes: Panel A shows how respondents update their beliefs about expected savings using a binned scatterplot. The x-axis reports the difference between the actual richest-1% appeal rate and respondents' prior beliefs about the richest-1% appeal rate. The y-axis reports the difference between posterior and prior beliefs about the expected savings from appealing (i.e., belief updating). Red circles (gray squares) represent the average update within each bin for the group of homeowners that were selected (were not selected) into the receiving information about the richest-1% appeal rate. Each line corresponds to the fitted values from a linear regression. The coefficients associated with the gap variable are reported in the upper left corner, as well as their robust standard errors (in parentheses), the p-value of the difference in the slopes, and the number of observations included in the analysis. Panel B shows how respondents update their beliefs about expected savings using a binned scatterplot. The x-axis reports the difference between the actual comparable appeal rate and respondents' prior beliefs about the comparable appeal rate. The y-axis reports the difference between posterior and prior beliefs about the expected savings from appealing (i.e., belief updating). Red circles (gray squares) represent the average update within each bin for the group of homeowners that were selected (were not selected) into the receiving information about the comparable appeal rate. Each line corresponds to the fitted values from a linear regression. The coefficients associated with the gap variable are reported in the upper left corner, as well as their robust standard errors (in parentheses), the p-value of the difference in the slopes, and the number of observations included in the analysis.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Balance

	Treatment: Received information about Richest-1% Comparable Savings									p-value
	All (1)	N N N (2)	Y N N (3)	N Y N (4)	N N Y (5)	Y Y N (6)	Y N Y (7)	N Y Y (8)	Y Y Y (9)	
Panel A. Administrative Data:										
2022 Home Value (\$1,000)	448.006 (4.224)	447.368 (12.704)	455.159 (11.768)	454.253 (11.400)	450.997 (12.605)	445.348 (11.073)	441.955 (11.311)	431.548 (11.780)	456.057 (13.001)	0.857
2022 Property Tax Amount (\$1,000s)	9.697 (0.088)	9.582 (0.252)	9.906 (0.253)	9.856 (0.240)	9.758 (0.251)	9.691 (0.241)	9.551 (0.235)	9.316 (0.238)	9.871 (0.267)	0.718
Homestead Exemption (%)	87.014 (0.554)	87.321 (1.629)	86.207 (1.555)	85.563 (1.621)	84.855 (1.694)	89.540 (1.401)	87.342 (1.529)	88.940 (1.507)	86.422 (1.592)	0.393
Homestead Exemption and Binding Cap (%)	66.205 (0.780)	69.378 (2.257)	64.097 (2.163)	65.180 (2.197)	62.138 (2.292)	69.247 (2.113)	66.034 (2.178)	67.972 (2.242)	65.948 (2.202)	0.253
2021 Owner Appeal Rate (%)	9.318 (0.479)	10.526 (1.503)	9.128 (1.298)	8.068 (1.256)	8.463 (1.315)	8.159 (1.253)	10.759 (1.425)	8.525 (1.342)	10.991 (1.454)	0.565
2020 Owner Appeal Rate (%)	17.169 (0.622)	16.746 (1.828)	16.836 (1.687)	16.561 (1.715)	15.145 (1.694)	16.946 (1.718)	19.409 (1.819)	16.590 (1.788)	18.966 (1.822)	0.739
2019 Owner Appeal Rate (%)	11.464 (0.525)	10.048 (1.472)	10.953 (1.408)	9.130 (1.329)	13.363 (1.608)	12.134 (1.495)	11.392 (1.461)	12.212 (1.573)	12.500 (1.537)	0.538
2018 Owner Appeal Rate (%)	10.052 (0.496)	8.373 (1.356)	11.359 (1.431)	8.280 (1.271)	9.800 (1.405)	10.251 (1.389)	9.916 (1.374)	12.673 (1.599)	9.698 (1.375)	0.399
Multiple Owners (%)	30.128 (0.756)	27.751 (2.193)	34.280 (2.140)	28.662 (2.086)	29.176 (2.148)	30.544 (2.109)	29.958 (2.106)	29.954 (2.201)	30.172 (2.133)	0.554
Living Area (1,000s Sq. Feet)	2.302 (0.014)	2.239 (0.041)	2.336 (0.039)	2.314 (0.040)	2.346 (0.043)	2.324 (0.041)	2.282 (0.039)	2.269 (0.042)	2.298 (0.041)	0.625
Number of Bedrooms	3.419 (0.012)	3.366 (0.037)	3.448 (0.033)	3.363 (0.035)	3.463 (0.036)	3.458 (0.034)	3.414 (0.035)	3.472 (0.034)	3.362 (0.036)	0.068
Number of Baths	2.287 (0.012)	2.242 (0.036)	2.284 (0.034)	2.272 (0.035)	2.303 (0.035)	2.331 (0.035)	2.291 (0.033)	2.279 (0.034)	2.291 (0.035)	0.816
Panel B. Survey Data:										
Republican (%)	32.723 (0.794)	31.969 (2.361)	34.534 (2.191)	30.425 (2.179)	31.765 (2.261)	34.792 (2.231)	33.187 (2.210)	32.673 (2.336)	32.135 (2.216)	0.880
Democrat (%)	49.170 (0.846)	46.803 (2.527)	50.212 (2.304)	48.546 (2.367)	48.941 (2.428)	51.204 (2.341)	47.473 (2.344)	51.238 (2.490)	48.764 (2.372)	0.870
Female (%)	41.726 (0.831)	43.401 (2.500)	42.947 (2.274)	40.133 (2.311)	40.047 (2.374)	41.215 (2.295)	44.565 (2.320)	41.872 (2.451)	39.644 (2.311)	0.770
Age	47.005 (0.188)	46.916 (0.575)	46.989 (0.538)	47.257 (0.516)	47.173 (0.526)	47.406 (0.525)	46.515 (0.523)	46.456 (0.545)	47.269 (0.516)	0.879
Race: White (%)	55.436 (0.838)	54.569 (2.512)	56.632 (2.276)	54.102 (2.349)	51.991 (2.421)	58.568 (2.297)	55.435 (2.320)	58.867 (2.445)	53.229 (2.357)	0.387
Education: Grad. Degree (%)	84.246 (0.614)	86.548 (1.721)	85.263 (1.628)	84.701 (1.697)	85.948 (1.684)	82.863 (1.757)	80.652 (1.844)	84.975 (1.776)	83.519 (1.753)	0.297
Observations	3,681	418	493	471	449	478	474	434	464	

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The statistics in Panel A are based on administrative records available on the DCAD website. The statistics in Panel B are based on survey responses. Column (1) is based on the entire subject pool. Column (2) is based on homeowners not selected to receive any information (N | N | N). Column (3) is based on homeowners selected to receive information on the appeal rate of the richest-1% of homeowners in 2021. Column (4) is based on homeowners selected to receive information on the appeal rate of comparable homeowners in 2021. Column (5) is based on the expected savings of comparable homeowners in 2021. Column (6) is selected to receive information on the richest-1% appeal rate and comparable households appeal rate. Column (7) is selected to receive information on the richest-1% appeal rate and the expected savings of comparable homeowners in 2021. Column (8) is selected to receive the appeal rate of comparable homeowners and the expected savings of comparable homeowners in 2021. Column (9) receives all three pieces of information for homeowners in 2021. Column (10) reports the p-value of a test of equal means across the eight treatment groups.

Table 2: Causal Effects of Beliefs (2SLS Estimates)

	Owner Appeal (1)	Appeal Intention (2)	Agent Appeal (3)	Successful Appeal (4)	Appeal Ineq. is Fair (5)	Tax Appeals Always Just (6)
Panel A: Total Effects						
Expected Savings (\$100s)	1.302** (0.570)	-0.472 (0.612)	-0.105 (0.253)	1.156** (0.551)	0.020* (0.012)	0.554 (0.423)
Richest-1% Appeal Rate	-0.034 (0.142)	-0.137 (0.136)	-0.020 (0.077)	-0.126 (0.138)	-0.005 (0.003)	0.111 (0.107)
Comparable Appeal Rate	-0.054 (0.157)	0.101 (0.146)	-0.052 (0.077)	0.016 (0.151)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.262** (0.114)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic:						
Expected Savings	12.868	12.785	12.868	12.868	14.794	12.785
Richest-1% Appeal Rate	561.011	561.011	561.011	561.011	528.353	561.011
Comparable Appeal Rate	179.349	179.349	179.349	179.349	161.714	179.343
Observations:						
Expected Savings	867	865	867	867	816	865
Richest-1% Appeal Rate	911	911	911	911	863	911
Comparable Appeal Rate	889	889	889	889	839	888
Panel B: Partial Effects						
Expected Savings (\$100s)	0.583*** (0.206)	-0.062 (0.215)	0.047 (0.106)	0.496** (0.195)	0.003 (0.005)	0.269 (0.169)
Richest-1% Appeal Rate	0.126 (0.086)	0.123 (0.080)	0.000 (0.048)	0.075 (0.083)	-0.005*** (0.002)	0.090 (0.066)
Comparable Appeal Rate	-0.072 (0.104)	0.051 (0.095)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.071 (0.100)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.053 (0.080)
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic						
Mean Outcome (Control)	15.106	15.027	15.106	15.106	15.196	14.986
Observations	45.933	62.919	7.416	35.885	0.000	83.014
	3,681	3,675	3,681	3,681	3,502	3,673

Notes: Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel A: Each column reports 2SLS estimates from three regressions using Equation 5 for expected savings, richest-1% appeal rate, and comparable appeal rate. Panel B: Each column reports 2SLS estimates from one regression using Equation 6. The outcome variable is indicated in the column title. Columns (1), (3), and (4) use outcome data from administrative tax records. Columns (2), (5), and (6) use survey responses. Column (5) is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation 1 in the control group. Column (6) is an indicator equal to 100 if the subject said that tax appeals were always completely justified.